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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

SOME NEGLECTED PHILOSOPHIC PROBLEMS REGARDING HISTORY[1]

THE following paper is primarily programmatic in character: I wish to call attention to some important theoretical problems which are, in my opinion, philosophical problems, but which are not often explicitly discussed by philosophers, and which are frequently not acknowledged to be philosophical problems by those who do discuss them. What these problems are will become clear as we proceed. I shall attempt to indicate their nature, and demonstrate their importance, through discussing the topic proposed for this symposium: "What Is a Philosophy of History?"

1. The Nature of Formal and Material Philosophies of History

Just as the term "history" has come to have two fundamentally different meanings, the one referring to occurrences in the past and the other referring to the knowledge, or supposed knowledge, of these occurrences, so the term "the philosophy of history" has come to refer to two different types of philosophic inquiry. These two types of inquiry are usually, and most conveniently, designated as "formal" and "material" philosophies of history. Briefly stated, a formal philosophy of history represents a philosophic concern with the problem of historical knowledge, while a material philosophy of history represents an attempt to interpret the historical process itself. Each of these characterizations demands some elaboration.

a) The formal philosophy of history may be said to have three different branches. The first of these involves a consideration of the problem of the "objectivity" of historical knowledge; that is, it is concerned with what constitutes valid knowledge of the historical process, and with estimating whether we may be said ever to possess such knowledge. The second branch involves a consideration of the relations between historical knowledge and other forms of knowledge or of pseudo-knowledge; for example, it is concerned with the relations between history and memory, be-

[1] Paper read at the 48th annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, December 28, 1951.

tween history and folklore, and between history and scientific modes of generalization (and, more particularly, with the relations between history and the social sciences). These two branches cover the main areas of modern formal philosophies of history; they are not, of course, without their connections, and neither can be claimed to be more basic than the other. However, the third branch of the formal philosophy of history clearly presupposes both of them. It is concerned with the question of what may be said to be the practical, educational, or intellectual value of a study of the past. This third branch, which we may term the pragmatics of the discipline of history, is not much discussed by those philosophers who are today concerned with the formal philosophy of history, but it does properly belong within their field.

b) Let us now examine the nature of a material philosophy of history. Here we cannot simply point to the problems with which such interpretations of the historical process are concerned, since—as the examples of Saint Augustine, Comte, Hegel, and Spencer clearly show—the scope of these problems varies widely from one such philosophy of history to another. Nor is it possible to find a single characteristic method of procedure in all classic examples of material philosophies of history. What all have in common is, rather, the attempt to find what may be termed some "meaning" within the whole of man's historical experience; this meaning they all seek to establish through discovering an ultimate principle which is claimed to be the most basic factor operative within history.

This characterization of the material philosophy of history demands further elucidation.

It must first be noted that the ultimate principle, or basic factor, operative within history is not necessarily conceived in the same terms in all philosophies of history. It is, I believe, useful to distinguish between two fundamentally different forms which such a principle may take. On the one hand, and perhaps most commonly, it is conceived of as being a law of history, which serves as an explanation of the ultimate direction of historical change.[2] Such theories can conveniently be distinguished into linear and morphological sub-species, the linear considering the whole of the history of mankind as a single history, while the morphological type

[2] For a critique of the attempts to establish such laws, see my "Critique of Philosophies of History," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XLV (1948), pp. 365 ff. As I now see, my definition of a material philosophy of history in terms of this type only, was inadequate. I wish to express my debt in this connection to Reinhold Niebuhr, whose *Faith and History* showed me the narrowness of the definition I had proposed.

(as exemplified in Spengler or Toynbee) views the fundamental law of history as being exemplified in the growth and death of self-enclosed civilizations. Further differentiations can of course also be made (for example, in terms of the methods by which such laws of history are ostensibly established, or the metaphysical interpretations which are given these laws), but with these problems I shall not here be concerned. It only remains to point out concerning this general type of a material philosophy of history that the search for an ultimate law of history commits one to a survey of universal history. Whatever is taken to be a significant part of man's historical experience must be included within a philosophy of history that seeks to establish a law which can serve to explain the ultimate direction of historical change.[3]

The second form which an ultimate principle of historical interpretation may take is not committed to any such survey of the whole of the "significant" past. In this type of philosophy of history the ultimate principle, or basic factor, operative within all history is not conceived as a law of historical development. Substituted for such a law is some explanatory concept which is held to be applicable to each and every crucial event in the historical process, and to be capable of affording a basis for grasping the meaning of the process. What may be termed a simple providential interpretation of history would serve as an example of this type of theory. Similarly, in Niebuhr's complex theological philosophy of history there is substituted for the idea of a necessary pattern or law of history, the view that in every historically significant event there is a tension between opposing pulls in human nature, and that the meaning of history can only be discerned in terms of the theological doctrine which renders intelligible the omnipresence of this factor.

Whether a material philosophy of history finds its interpretative principle in a developmental law of history or in some other factor believed to be universally operative in the historical process, it is such a principle which is held to give the processes of history a "meaning." It is to the elucidation of what constitutes "meaning," when used in this sense, that we must now turn.

"Meaning," as the term is here used, refers to the "significance" of the historical process, its import for man as a valuing being. The philosopher of history, like all other men, finds certain

[3] The circularity of this is of course apparent: the law of history is used to render intelligible the significant portions of man's historical experience; what is significant is that which manifests the law. This circularity appears in both linear and morphological theories, as is easily seen in both Hegel and Toynbee.

entities to be the proper object of attitudes such as hope, fear, admiration, reverence, resignation, or defiance. In thinking of events of the past, in contemplating the present, or in considering the possibilities of the future, he, like other men, is not left unmoved: some of these events or possibilities, and some of the persons or entities which are involved in them, seem to be proper objects of certain valuational attitudes. When the ultimate principle which is thought to be exemplified in the historical process is either the source of or is taken as a justification for these attitudes, the concrete phenomena of history take on a "meaning." In other words, meaning is found in history when actual events are interpreted in terms of an ultimate principle which is held to be not only capable of explaining what has occurred but also serves to indicate what attitude it is proper to adopt toward these events. Thus, every material philosophy of history possesses an ultimate principle of interpretation which serves as a connective link between a reading of the actual events of history and what is taken as a standard of evaluation for history.[4]

In summary let me say that every material philosophy of history involves the attempt to find a principle of explanation which is the most ultimate explanation which can be given of the particular events in history, or of their sequences; it attempts to apply such a principle to all of history, either by tracing out the actual course of events which exemplify this law of historical change, or by showing that at each point in history what has occurred exemplifies the validity of this explanation; and, whichever form of explanation is used, it holds that this ultimate principle is morally significant in the sense that it is able to show what attitude men ought to adopt toward the events of the past or of their own time, or toward the possibilities which are open to them in the future. Thus, we may define a material philosophy of history as the attempt to discover within the facts of history some principle which is taken as the ultimate explanation of why these facts are as they are, and which, it is believed, ought to be determinative of our attitudes toward these facts.

[4] To the extent that some sociologists believe that the laws of development (or the universal constants) which they seek to establish not only represent ultimate explanatory principles but also serve to indicate the proper standard of valuation for history, they may be—and usually have been—termed philosophers of history. Further, it might also be legitimate to say that he who would set up the universal proposition that there is *no* meaning in history, and who would offer this proposition as a justification for his attitude toward specific events, has a "philosophy of history." To say this, however, would be to use the term in an extended sense; such a philosophy of history would be far different from the classic constructive examples.

What the methodological difficulties of such an enterprise may be, or even whether it is a legitimate enterprise, is not my concern in this paper. However, I wish now to examine what relations may be said to obtain between formal and material philosophies of history.

c) During the past half-century it was widely held that a formal philosophy of history is, in a methodological sense, more basic than a material philosophy of history, and should serve as a necessary propaedeutic to it. The reason for this belief is not far to seek. Since a material philosophy of history presupposes a grasp of the nature of historical events, anything which sheds light upon the adequacy or inadequacy of our historical knowledge will have important implications for the material philosophy of history.

To be sure, a formal philosophy of history is not generally claimed to be a necessary propaedeutic to a material philosophy of history in the sense that one cannot make an attempt to construct the latter without first investigating the former. Such a contention would be as untrue as it would be to hold that no historian can embark on an historical inquiry unless he has first reached a reasoned conclusion regarding the problems which arise in the formal philosophy of history. Like the historian, one who constructs a material philosophy of history makes certain assumptions regarding the objectivity of historical knowledge and regarding the relations of such knowledge to other forms of knowledge; it need not be his task to examine these assumptions. However, it is proper for the formal philosophy of history to examine them; and any justified conclusion which is reached regarding such assumptions will be relevant to the acceptance or rejection of the material philosophy of history in question. It is in this sense that the formal philosophy of history may be considered to be methodologically more basic than the material philosophy of history.

However, it is one of the most significant features of the recent revival of interest in the material philosophy of history that this conviction has been either disregarded or openly challenged. If I am not mistaken, there is even a tendency in some quarters to view a material philosophy of history as providing a means by which one can test the adequacy of a formal philosophy of history. However, I do not find that any of the arguments which have been offered to prove the autonomy of a material philosophy of history are successful, and I should personally conclude that the more usual contention regarding the methodological priority of a formal philosophy of history is warranted.

The real strength of recent attacks upon this contention comes from the fact that those who have concerned themselves with the

problem of historical knowledge (and here I include my own work in the field) have overlooked the extent to which an adequately comprehensive formal philosophy of history must make assumptions regarding the nature and status of historical entities. Since material philosophies of history have been more cognizant of the importance of these problems, and frequently have explicitly discussed them, there is some merit in the claim that formal philosophies of history, as presently developed, take for granted solutions to some of the problems which material philosophies of history critically discuss. However, as I shall attempt to show, the type of non-epistemological assumptions which a formal philosophy of history must make, are not themselves adequately established within a material philosophy of history. Thus it will be my contention that there is need for an attempt to solve certain problems which appear in both formal and material philosophies of history, and it is my primary, or programmatic, purpose to call these neglected problems to your attention.

2. *Non-epistemological Assumptions in the Formal Philosophy of History*

As has been noted, the two most basic concerns of a formal philosophy of history are the attempt to assess the degree to which historical knowledge may be claimed to be "objective" and the attempt to define the place which such knowledge occupies in the total economy of knowledge. These problems are, as I have indicated, interconnected: we cannot adequately assess the objectivity of historical knowledge without having a view as to what such knowledge may be said to aim to achieve, and we cannot understand its relations to such other areas of human thought as myth or scientific generalizations without having some fairly definite views as to what warranted claims to objectivity may be made on its behalf. In attempting to reach a conclusion on these two interlocking problems we must, I submit, first consult the nature of actual historical works: we must critically examine the underlying assumptions and procedures of practicing historians. To be sure, these assumptions will, to some extent, differ from historian to historian, but it is not illegitimate to say that one can raise problems concerning the types of assumptions and the more general methods of procedure which are common to most, if not all, of those works which are by common consent designated as historical works. The types of assumptions and the methods of procedure which are characteristic of these works will then, in most cases, be found to be related to, if they are not identical with, the assump-

tions and procedures which are present in other works which, at the outset, we did not know whether we should include among the examples of historical inquiry.

Now it is, I believe, characteristic of those works which are universally acknowledged to be historical works that they are concerned to understand and depict the nature of, and the changes in, the life of specific societies. An event or a person is of importance to the historian in so far as that event or person is seen as being significant for the life of a society at any one time, or for changes which have occurred in that society.[5] If this suggested definition of the subject-matter of the historian is accepted, it becomes clear that it is a necessary, and not an accidental, feature of historical works that they should employ terms which refer to the various aspects of man's life in an organized society; that persons are characterized with respect to their institutionalized status; that events are estimated with respect to their political, economic, religious, literary, or other, implications. No recognized historical work merely chronicles the actions of "unclassified" persons, nor traces a course of events without making reference to its place in the life of the society in which it transpired. The historian, in brief, views all of his subject-matter in its societal context and in the light of its societal implications. For this reason every historical account necessarily proceeds on the basis of what is at least an implicit theory of the nature of a society.

Now, the historian himself may not be interested in making his assumptions concerning the nature of a society explicit; neither will he always be willing to generalize on the basis of them. He may in effect say that he has used societal terms in the manner which seemed best suited to the documents with which he worked, and that it is the function of someone else (if anyone else should be interested) to trace the assumptions which he has made, and to appraise their validity. Whether, for example, the implicit definition of "a nation" or of "literature" which might be extracted from his manner of treating a national history or a literary movement is or is not an adequate definition for all instances might not concern him; it is adequate for his purposes if it enables him to organize and render intelligible all of the documents with which he wishes (or finds himself forced) to deal.

Such a position is not uncommon, though it is far from universal. Whether it is ultimately tenable is not a problem which

[5] Cf. Mandelbaum: *The Problem of Historical Knowledge*, pp. 9 ff.; Bernheim: *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode*, Ch. 1, Sect. 1; Barth: *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie*, Ch. 1.

I shall here discuss. For the sake of the argument, let us grant that it may be upheld. What I should now like to point out is that although a practicing historian may make this agnostic plea, a person who is concerned with the formal philosophy of history cannot adopt the same attitude. If he is to estimate the objectivity or lack of objectivity of historical accounts, and if he is to find what relation obtains between historical accounts and, say, scientific generalizations, he must examine the nature and ontological status of those cultural entities to which the historian makes reference. Such an examination will not, in itself, answer the problems with which a formal philosophy of history is concerned, but it is an indispensable prerequisite to a comprehensive and thoroughly grounded answer. This can, I believe, be seen from the following considerations.

1. Some of the entities with which historians deal are the actions of individual persons, but many are such "collective entities" or "abstractions" as the United States, the Catholic Church, the Monroe Doctrine, the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings, the guild system, the stock-market crash of 1929, or Deism. A formal philosophy of history cannot maintain neutrality concerning the general nature and ontological status of "collective entities" or "abstractions" of this type (or of these types), since the extent to which a historian may be said to grasp their nature through the documents or protocols to which he has access will be determined in no small measure by the view which is taken on these issues. For example, if those entities or events were to be defined merely in terms of the behavior of all of the individuals whose activities entered into them, and their history were, consequently, merely an aspect of the histories of each of these individuals, the histories of at least some of the above mentioned entities could not plausibly be claimed to be knowable: the material for even a fairly adequate history of the United States or of the Catholic Church could never be collected, much less organized or written. In order that we may claim to know as inclusive and long-enduring an entity as the Catholic Church we must be in a position to single out for consideration the activities of those individuals who, by reason of their status, were important in the history of that institution; but to know what it means to have a particular status in an institution involves us in knowing the institution, and is not reducible, without circularity, to how an individual influences the actions of other individuals. What institutions are, and how we may know them, is therefore an important problem which anyone interested in the objectivity of

historical knowledge must face if he is to justify the claim that an historian can attain adequate knowledge of that which has occurred.[6]

2. It is universally agreed that the historian must, in almost all cases, make a selection from among the data to which he has access. The question of the possibility of historical objectivity hinges upon the question of whether or not there are criteria which justify one selection rather than another. Now, the practicing historian does as a matter of fact select his materials (or think that he is selecting his materials) on the basis of which events are relevant to the political, economic, religious, or other aspects of the society with which he deals.[7] If the formal philosophy of history is to examine whether such accounts are governed by a criterion of selection which yields the possibility of "objectivity," it must inquire into the validity of grouping facts under these aspects and seek to ascertain in what sense, if any, what is called a political event is inherently connected with other political events of that time and place. In short, it must ask whether these classificatory categories are based upon characteristics which are grounded in the nature of societies, or whether they are categories which each historian may redefine at will in order to organize the data with which he happens—or wants—to deal.

3. The historian speaks of one event as causally related to one or more other historical events, and it is, of course, one of the major problems of a formal philosophy of history to assess what meaning, if any, can be attached to the notion of historical causation, and how historical causes are related, if at all, to the formulation of sociological, psychological, economic, and other, laws. Now, it is possible to treat these problems in terms of a general or abstract philosophical theory of causation and law, and thus not raise any questions concerning the nature and status of the specific types of events with which historians deal. However, the existence of conflicting theories concerning the applicability of the concepts of cause and law to historical events, makes it incumbent upon one who is concerned with the problem of historical knowledge to examine whether or not a philosophic treatment of these

[6] In this connection we may note that those who deny the objectivity of historical knowledge frequently base their contention upon the fact that no historian can ever attain knowledge of the activities of that vast host of individuals who participated in any historical event: in other words, because they assume that the "abstractions" or "collective entities" with which the historian deals are reducible without remainder to the actions of a sum of individuals, they deny the possibility of adequate historical knowledge.

[7] Or, if his is a specialized study, to the events relevant to one of these.

problems as they arise in, say, the natural sciences, has any applicability to historical materials. This necessitates an examination of the nature of these materials.

These three considerations are, I believe, sufficient to show that a formal philosophy of history cannot reach an adequately grounded conclusion regarding its fundamental problems merely by examining the practice of historians and attempting to relate this practice to general epistemological discussions. It is my thesis that in every such attempt one can find that assumptions have been made concerning the nature and, I believe, the ontological status of some of the most important entities with which historians deal. A critical examination of the alternative assumptions which have been made and a tracing of their implications may, if one wishes, be included within the province of a formal philosophy of history. If so, then these are problems which have been almost entirely neglected in the literature of the field. However, since the implications of these problems, and, in fact, the empirical materials needed for their solution, are by no means confined to the province of history as a discipline, it would seem to me advisable to say that a formal philosophy of history must make assumptions drawn from what I shall call the problems of a critical social philosophy.

3. Critical Social Philosophy and the Material Philosophy of History

Problems concerning the nature and ontological status of social entities are frequently discussed in material philosophies of history. When they are not explicitly discussed their presence may none the less be detected. Among the more obvious of such problems I would cite the following: first, what constitutes a nation or a civilization; second, what status is to be ascribed to social institutions, and how are they related to the activities of individuals (e.g., do they, in some sense, "have a life of their own"); third, what meaning can be ascribed to terms such as "the spirit of the age," and what status is to be ascribed to such a spirit?

Now, questions such as these belong, I have claimed, to what may be called a critical social philosophy. Although they are discussed by those concerned with the material philosophy of history, answers to them in fact function as assumptions for any material philosophy of history, rather than being propositions which a material philosophy of history can prove. This can be seen from the following considerations.

1. Those who attempt to establish that there is an ultimate law of historical development do not attempt to prove that this law is exemplified in every particular event which occurs at any

place or time in the historical process. Rather, certain types of event are chosen as the real "bearers of history." What these events are—whether they are nations or civilizations or strands of development within certain human institutions—is of decisive importance for both the formulation of the law and for the conditions under which it can be verified. However, the selection of what types of event are the real "bearers of history" raises precisely the questions of definition and ontological status with which we are concerned. He who sets up such a law of development has already selected the materials to which his law is to be applied on the basis of the assumptions which he has made concerning these questions. Therefore, it is not the law which he sets up which establishes what the answers to these questions must be; it is the nature of his answers to them which will, in large measure, dictate the nature of the law which he applies to history. All that can be claimed for the relevance of such a law to the assumptions which are made, is that anyone who finds this law to be an adequate interpretation of the ultimate principle of history will have reason to say that these assumptions are more fruitful, and presumably truer, than a contrary set of assumptions.

2. Those who construct a material philosophy of history on the basis of factors which they believe to be operative at every point in the historical process, and who do not seek to establish a law of historical development, must, I should claim, also make assumptions regarding the nature and status of the basic elements in man's social life. This may be most clearly seen if we ask the question of whether we should look to some factor in the nature of man's constitution (as does Niebuhr) or to some factor in the organization of life in society (e.g., technology) in order to find the ultimate explanation which we seek. Once again we can see that it is not from the establishment of a universal principle that our definitions of social institutions and our views concerning their status will follow; it is our assumptions concerning these problems which will channelize our search for such a principle. And, once again, it is to be noted that a material philosophy of history only throws light on the validity of such assumptions indirectly: to the extent to which it is viewed as adequate it affords a presumption that these assumptions, rather than others, are true.

3. In constructing a material philosophy of history one must espouse some theory concerning the ways in which entities within the historical process are related to one another. Here the general metaphysical position of the philosopher of history plays an important, or even decisive, role. His views on the nature of causation, on teleology, and on kindred questions, are inescapably in-

volved. However, such metaphysical assumptions do not operate *in vacuo:* the actual interpretation which he gives concerning the relations between historical entities is also in part determined by his conception of the nature of these entities and the ontological status which may be ascribed to them. Thus, in this perhaps most important of all aspects of a material philosophy of history, the type of assumption which we have noted plays an important role.

4. Concerning a Critical Social Philosophy

What is usually designated as "Social Philosophy" is an agglomerate mass of empirical and normative questions, drawn from political theory, comparative government, "philosophical anthropology," and normative ethics. It is usually concerned to discuss problems involving the evaluation of social institutions. However important these problems may be, it is not with them that what I term a Critical Social Philosophy is concerned. In fact, I think it may reasonably be held that a Social Philosophy of the traditional type can only successfully proceed if it is founded upon an adequate analysis of the nature of the entities which constitute a society and of the types of relations which obtain among these entities. It is my opinion that in this case, as in others, what Broad has termed the *critical* function of philosophy has important implications for the synthetic, or *speculative,* aspect of the philosophical enterprise.

The problems which a Critical Social Philosophy must face are problems which are now coming to be recognized as important by those empirical social scientists who have sought to clarify the nature of their own methods and the relations which their respective disciplines bear to each other. Among these problems the one which has been most frequently raised is whether psychological concepts provide an adequate basis for an understanding of sociological phenomena.[8] As is well known, this problem was clearly and explicitly raised by Durkheim, and it is still an important subject of debate, as the theoretical writings of Kroeber, Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, Kardiner, Herskovits, and others, testify. In the course of these debates it is abundantly clear that the problem of the nature and ontological status of social institutions, and the problem of whether there are emergent sociological laws, raise philosophical issues.[9] Similarly, in the examinations of the nature of sociological explanations which we find in Par-

[8] A similar problem has been widely discussed by economic theorists.

[9] The same issue is posed for political theory by works such as Lasswell and Kaplan's *Power and Society.*

sons, in Merton, and in Nadel, there are numerous philosophical issues. All of these issues are, I submit, worthy of the same kind of attention which philosophers of science devote to the philosophical issues which are raised by the physical sciences. While any practicing scientist may (presumably) adopt a position of neutrality on all of the philosophical issues which his discipline raises, a philosopher of science cannot bracket ontological and epistemological problems. Similarly, the social sciences raise problems which transcend a mere discussion of actual methodologies and force a philosopher who is interested in these sciences to raise questions concerning the ontological status of the materials with which the empirical social scientist deals. The task of examining these questions, and of relating our methodological considerations to them, is, I submit, a task for a Critical Social Philosophy. And if my foregoing argument concerning formal and material philosophies of history has been correct, the exploration of these questions is essential to the construction of any adequately grounded formal philosophy of history, and will also provide one of the bases upon which we may examine the validity of the claims of any material philosophy of history.

MAURICE MANDELBAUM

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY?[1]

TO answer the question, what is philosophy of history, let us place before ourselves statements drawn from three leading contemporary philosophies of history. Then let us inquire what they have in common by way of their purpose and modes of proof. Whitehead, Marx, and Toynbee are the philosophers of history whom we shall thus examine.

Whitehead's theory of history is simply stated: "Advance or decadence are the only choices offered to mankind. The pure conservative is fighting against the essence of the universe."[2] Whitehead's doctrine is a liberal philosophy of history.

[1] Paper read in a symposium on "What is Philosophy of History?" at the 48th annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, at Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, on December 28, 1951.

[2] Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, New York, 1933, p. 354. Liberalism is herein used as a philosophical, not a partisan ascription. In this sense, it is noteworthy that younger, more philosophically inclined leaders of the English Conservative Party have begun to accept Whitehead's philosophy as their own. This movement was described a few years ago: "The Whiteheadian cosmology provided the philosophy of traditionalism, and elaborated

Marx's theory is exemplified by the classical phrases of *The Communist Manifesto:* "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. . . . What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable." Marx's doctrine sets forth a proletarian-communist philosophy of history.

Toynbee's statements are part of a Christian philosophy of history. He thus says, for example: "The greatest new event . . . will still be the Crucifixion and its spiritual consequences. . . ." ". . . it is the historical function of civilizations to serve, by their downfalls, as stepping-stones to a progressive process of the revelation of always deeper religious insight. . . ." ". . . if our secular Western civilization perishes, Christianity may be expected not only to endure but to grow in wisdom and stature. . . ."[3] And the decline of civilizations, Toynbee says, is not due to the assault of external powers; "the broken-down civilizations have not met their death from an assassin's hand," the fundamental cause of breakdowns is internal discord, "the estrangement between minority and majority which eventually comes to a head in the secession of the proletariat. . . ."[4]

These philosophies of history share certain properties. Each one of them knows the essence of the universe, the direction that events must take, or the culminating chapter which must be written to the historic narrative. Marx sees the necessary advent of communism, Toynbee beholds the universal effulgence of a Catholic Christendom, and Whitehead sees creative progress as the law of things. Each one of these theories, moreover, affirms that history will realize those values which the philosopher prizes. The liberal finds that the universe as a whole adheres to liberalism, the com-

the role of the past, or 'antecedent nexus of occasions,' the will of the individual, and the moral values of 'eternal objects,' in the formation of the process which is the universe." "It is immediately apparent how closely this theoretical analysis coincides with the traditional beliefs of Conservatism as expounded by Bolingbroke, Burke, Disraeli, Balfour and in the latest instance by the *Conservative Faith in a Modern Age*. . . . It also becomes apparent from this analysis that various objectives such as the classless state, the highest good of the greatest number, 'Leviathan', the 'princely' ideal, benevolent dictatorship and unrestrained individualism are at best abstractions of a less ultimate nature than the aim of maintaining the equilibrium of the entire process." John Lowe, "Conservatism and the Universities," *Nineteenth Century*, Vol. CXLII (1947), pp. 195, 197.

[3] Arnold J. Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial*, New York, 1948, pp. 236, 237, 239.

[4] Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Abridgment of Volumes I–VI by D. C. Somervell, New York, 1947, pp. 275, 365–366.

munist finds that the historical dialectic necessarily moves toward proletarian triumph, the Christian philosopher finds Christianity transcendent in survival even as the secular world declines.

We may describe philosophies of history, in the first place, as *projective propositions.* A projective proposition is one which ascribes one's own "values" to the external world; a projective proposition attributes to the external world the occurrence of events which are desired by the person. There is a projective method which the psychologists call the "story-completion" test. A person is told the incidents of a narrative except for the ending; he is directed to provide that himself. The ending which is provided is an indicator of the conflicts, anxieties, frustrations, desires, of the person. Philosophies of history are much like story-completions which the philosopher appends to some fragments of the past and present. They arise especially as responses to conditions of historical crisis. Philosophies of history, as projective systems, are defensive measures against historical anxiety. Within this crisis-experience, they offer the assurance that one is sustained by the "meaning" of history. A projective proposition, indeed, asserts a specific "meaning" for history. According to the projective standpoint, as one penetrates the manifest contents of history to their underlying realities, one finds that the underlying reality is an embodiment of one's values.

What we have said by way of psychologic characterization of philosophies of history would in the cases we have mentioned be confirmed by the available biographical evidence. Whitehead, in a self-protrait, remarked: "You have in me a typical example of the Victorian Englishman. I have been struck with the fact that every cause I have in any way voted for in England has finally reached such triumphs as a cause can reach. I have never, never been at final variance with the bulk of my countrymen. . . ."[5]

[5] *Symposium in Honor of the Seventieth Birthday of Alfred North Whitehead,* Cambridge, Mass., p. 24. Cf. *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead,* ed. by Paul Arthur Schilpp, Northwestern University, 1941, pp. 5, 13. A mystical faith in the preëminence of the values of the traditional English governing élite was already becoming a part of Whitehead's outlook when he was a schoolboy. He writes of the education at St. Aldhelm's School: "This aesthetic background was an essential element in the education, explanatory alike of inertia and of latent idealism. The education can not be understood unless it is realized that it elucidated an ever-present dream world in our subconscious life." It is true that "their fathers rode with foxhounds," and "achieved a good deal of patronage of their social inferiors." Nevertheless, says Whitehead, the values of a Stanley Baldwin were essentially sound. From those woodlands, he writes, has been whispered the "secret of governing England." Classical history was a study in analogues: the Athenian navy was Britain's

Confronted by the crises of the twentieth century, Whitehead responded with the affirmation that his liberal values were the essence of historic process.

But what of an assertion like Marx's, that "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles"? In what sense can this sociological generalization be described as a projective proposition? Taken by itself, it makes no predictions as to the future course of history. We may nevertheless perceive its projective character if we perform a simple experiment. Let us substitute the word "submission" for "struggle" in the sentences of the Communist Manifesto, and make other corresponding substitutions. The Communist Manifesto then becomes a Manifesto of Defeat, of Acquiescence: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class submission. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, have always existed in some form side by side; revolutionaries, dreamers, and idealistic men have sought to stir the oppressed into a revolutionary struggle and reconstitution of society, but always, what has asserted itself is the submissiveness of man, and his acquiescence to oppression."

Now it will be agreed that there is a considerable body of human history which confirms the Manifesto of Acquiescence. Asiatic despotisms, caste systems, slave societies, are instances of class submission, and they are as impressive in history, with their depressive character, as those moments in which classes have taken to struggle to realize their aims. How can Marx then simply aver that all social history is a history of class struggles? Some social history could thus be described, but certainly not all history. When this question is raised, there are two ways in which the Marxian philosopher of history may reply. He can, in the first place, re-define the word "struggle" so that it embraces all cases of class submission. It is a sociological fact, indeed, that an oppressed class, even when it submits, harbors resentment and feelings of repressed aggression. The dreams and fantasies of men of the lower castes are filled with symbols of hatred for their social superiors as well as for themselves. Repressed aggressive impulses are not, however, an overt struggle of classes. The self-hatred of the oppressed is indeed an aspect of class submission. The revolutionist who tries to stir such a group to "class consciousness" urges them to redirect their hatred from themselves to their oppressors. He

fore-runner. Classical education was a training for the Empire's bishops and commanders-in-chief. Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, "The Education of an Englishman," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. CXXXVIII (1926), pp. 192–198.

thereby tries to change a situation of submission to one of struggle. One can use the word "struggle" so that it applies to cases where people don't struggle; the distinction between expressed and repressed aggressive impulses, none the less, remains, as does that between aggression toward others and aggression displaced against one's self. The Marxian thesis becomes in effect an analytic proposition. All history is then a history of class struggles, because, by definition, even a class which is broken and acquiescent is said to struggle against its oppressor.

In the second place, the Marxian philosopher may seek to redefine the word "history" so that its content consists solely of class struggles. History is a record of social permanences as well as changes. History in the *Pentateuch* is often a chronicle of the monotonous succession of generations; the patriarchal social system, the pastoral economy, remain unchanging. One might say that in such a world there is no history, for there is no change in social institutions. And if we exclude all periods of stationary social existence from "history," we can hold plausibly that history is the history of class struggles. Such a procedure, however, is tantamount to transforming the Marxian statement into an analytic proposition concerning "history." "History" is taken to denote only those occurrences which are the consequences of changing forces in class conflict; the persistent configurations of social permanence, the occurrences which are the outcome of class submission, inertia, docility are excluded from denotation.

What we know of Marx's personality indicates that his theory was a projection upon history of his own "ultimate value," Struggle. Marx lived in an age before Rorschach Tests, but he did once answer a psychologic questionnaire put to him by his daughters. His answers to this "value-attitude" test take us to the projective source of his philosophy of history:

"Your idea of happiness—To fight."
"The vice you detest most—Servility."
"Hero—Spartacus, Kepler."[6]

An American journalist, John Swinton, interveiwed Marx for the *New York Sun* in 1880 and asked him the most ultimate question, "What is?" "And it seemed as though his mind were inverted for a moment while he looked upon the roaring sea in front and the restless multitude upon the beach. 'What is?' I had inquired, to which in deep and solemn tone, he replied 'Struggle.'" Struggle was Marx's idea of happiness, struggle was his ultimate meta-

[6] Cf. D. Ryazanoff, ed., *Karl Marx*, New York, 1927, p. 269.

physical category, just as creativity was Whitehead's highest value, and his universal of universals.

A projective vision which tries to sustain itself against the historical evidence is always driven to such devices as that which turns its philosophical assertions into analytic propositions. We might illustrate this point further by reference to Toynbee's theory of the decline of civilizations. Toynbee holds that civilizations decline because of the workings of internal causes which undermine their social systems. What, however, of events such as the barbarian invasions which contributed to the decline of Rome? How are the barbarian invasions to be regarded as an immanent cause? Toynbee meets this difficulty by converting his doctrine of the "secession of the proletariat" into an analytic proposition. The Barbarians, Toynbee says, "were, after all, not external powers, but were really children of the Hellenic household who had been morally alienated from the dominant minority." The Barbarians, he holds, were an "external proletariat." A "proletariat," for Toynbee, is "a social group which in some way is 'in' but not 'of' any given society."[7] The Barbarians often came from Central Asia, but according to Toynbee's usage of words, they were part of the Roman proletariat. An external factor is thus converted by terminological means into an immanent cause, and the theory of decline as due to internal factors becomes an analytic proposition.

Every philosophy of history, secondly, is a disguised ethical argument. The structure of its argument is the following:

"The universe is such-and-such: be thou, therefore, likewise."

For instance, the liberal philosophy affirms:

"The universe is animated by creative progress: be thou, therefore, likewise, a progressive."

The communist philosophy affirms:

"The universe is inherently revolutionary; be thou, therefore, likewise a revolutionist."

If we analyze the force of this argument, we find that it rests upon an appeal to the preponderant power of historical movement. Shall the individual be so presumptuous as to set his own judgment against the nature of history? This is a species of philosophic *argumentum ad baculum* which Job rejected when he declared that though God slay him, he would maintain his own ways.

[7] Toynbee, *A Study of History*, p. 261.

A philosophy of history can thus become the vehicle whereby people are persuaded to accept "values" which are contrary to their desires for happiness. Toynbee, for instance, regards history as a testimony to the divinity of suffering; its final symbol is Christ Crucified. In writing, therefore, the history of the Negros and the Jews, he exalts those phases of their experience which have been given over to masochist adulation of suffering and resignation. "The American Negro," Toynbee writes, "finding the scales thus, to all seeming, permanently and overwhelmingly against him in This World, has turned to another world for consolation." The Negro, he continues, has opened his impressionable mind to the Christian message, and with his "childlike spiritual intuition" may rekindle the cold ashes of Christianity. "If this miracle were indeed to be performed by an American Negro Church, that would be the most dynamic response to the challenge of social penalization that had yet been made by man."[8] Toynbee's philosophy of history thus adjures the Negro people to conform to the stereotype of their childlike quality, and to rejoice in their distinction as a suffering people. These "values" are those which Negroes are now shedding as alien to their own free choices; they are "values" which, in the phrase of recent writers, are the "mark of oppression," not the choice of freedom.[9]

Likewise, in his rendition of Jewish history, Toynbee finds especially commendable the "sublimely heroic non-resistance of Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai, who separated himself from the Jewish Zealots in order that he might quietly continue his teaching out of earshot of the battle."[10] Toynbee praises this action because it supplanted what he calls the revolutionary futurist hopes of the Jewish proletariat with the religious ideal of transfiguration. We may, however, in a more realistic fashion, observe that ben Zakkai was the leading proponent of appeasement, of collaboration with the Roman oppressor, that he justified evasion of service in the Jewish Army, and contributed toward fashioning a Rabbinical Judaism which was suffused with traits of masochism.[11] These are "values" which Jewish thinkers today reject as the instruments of self-hatred; the efforts in Israel today, for example, are not in ben Zakkai's spirit.

The analysis of philosophies of history should make explicit

[8] Toynbee, *A Study of History*, p. 129.

[9] Cf. Abram Kardiner and Lionel Ovesey, *The Mark of Oppression*, New York, 1951.

[10] Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 434–435.

[11] Cf. Louis Finkelstein, *Akiba, Scholar, Saint, and Martyr*, New York, 1936, pp. 60–67.

their projective backgrounds, because one can then readily perceive how "values" like struggle or suffering are being commended as ends-in-themselves, and how a projectively reconstructed history becomes the device of ideological persuasion. A philosophy of history, in its customary signification, may then be defined as a projective system in which the underlying reality of history is found to coincide with the philosopher's values, which forecasts the outcome of history as a fulfillment of these values, and suggests to others that they would do well to enroll themselves among the triumphant forces of history.

When we have turned from the analysis of philosophies of history as projective constructions, the question arises whether we can hope to achieve a realistic philosophy of history. I use "realistic" as a psychologic characterization, to denote an outlook free from projective components. Certainly the need for such a philosophy is widely felt. People wish to know whether an overall law of history can be known, whether every economy can be shown to harbor a necessary development of disequilibrium, what individual effort can hope to achieve in a world of impersonal social forces. A realistic philosophy of history will be concerned with those basic issues in the social sciences which are of particular concern to our attitudes and decisions with respect to contemporary historic movements.

The historical experience of the last two decades has led many men to question the extent to which our received systems of social theory provide a basis for scientific prediction. There is a questioning as to the extent to which the events of human history can be subsumed under a system of determinate sociological laws. At the present juncture, therefore, an analysis of the forms and conditions of sociological laws is especially required to clarify the status of *historical indeterminacy*. A realistic theory of history, in my opinion, will recognize a domain in which verifiable answers are not possible. Contrary-to-fact conditional propositions are not a serious problem for the physical scientist; they do constitute a serious limitation, however, for the analysis of history. An engineer can verify a statement such as: If this bridge had been made of high-grade steel, it would not have collapsed under this load. So long as the relevant physical dimensions are similar, one physical object is substitutable for another in experiment. Nothing like this obtains in critical social situations. One personality is not substitutable for another in the way an electron is, and a methodological indeterminacy dogs our effort to answer such questions as: Had the assassin's bullet struck Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932, would an American fascism have subsequently developed?

If Hitler had been assassinated in 1942, would European Jewry have survived? Ordinary laws of social science such as those of supply and demand are verifiable in innumerable situations of both free and controlled markets. But the crisis-situations, where individual choice and contribution seem most significant, are recalcitrant to the analysis of determinate sociological law. The multiplicity of interpretations of history seems to me to be largely due to this methodological indeterminacy; interpretations abound because of our inability to confirm any given one of them. This seems to me as important in explaining the proliferation of historical interpretations as the possible richness of events and variables, to which Professor Friess has given emphasis.

An interpretation of history, so far as it is verifiable, consists of laws of social science which are used to show how certain events were the initial conditions for subsequent events. The laws of social science which are thus used to reconstruct the past are derived, in the first place, from the study of contemporary social phenomena. John Maynard Keynes, for instance, once undertook to show how the rise of European prices during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the result of an inflow of precious metals from America. In so doing, he was employing laws of monetary theory which are confirmed in present-day economic events in order to reconstruct past economic history. The use of such laws, moreover, suggests hypotheses about the past, and sets the economic historian on a quest for data which will confirm or disconfirm the given theory. The laws of money, for instance, suggested to Keynes the following hypotheses: that the civilizations of Sumeria and Egypt drew their stimulus from the gold of Arabia and the copper of Africa, that Alexander's dispersal of the bank reserves of Persia was responsible for the outburst of economic progress in the Mediterranean region, that the long stagnation of the Middle Ages was caused by Europe's meager supply of the monetary metals.[12]

The use of causal laws to reconstruct the past is not unique to the methods of social history. It is the method which is now commonplace among geologists, though arduous controversy was once required to compel its acceptance. The school of uniformitarians in the early nineteenth century argued that to reconstruct the geologic past one must make extrapolative use of agencies the effects of which are observable in the present, as, for example, rain, erosion, and glacial action. The school of catastrophists re-

[12] Cf. John Maynard Keynes, *A Treatise on Money*, New York, 1930, Vol. II, pp. 150–151, 152–155.

plied that past phenomena could not be understood through the analogy of present occurrences. Charles Lyell was the powerful exponent of the uniformitarian standpoint. He argued cogently that it was the sole basis for constructing a verifiable theory of the past; the other alternative led to arbitrary *ad hoc* hypotheses.[13] A similar postulate of historical uniformity underlies work to reconstruct man's past.

A principle of historical methodology is, from our standpoint, an instance of applied social science, the use of laws of social science to find more knowledge. Let us consider such rules of historical method as, for instance, "ascertain the bias of your historical source in order to be on the lookout where this bias may distort its report of facts"; "a source becomes less trustworthy the more its narrative depends on distant memories and less on contemporary record." Every rule of historical method will be found to be an instance of a sociological or psychological causal law formulated in the language of methodology. The first rule, for instance, corresponds to the causal law that in a high proportion of cases, the socio-economic prejudices of people are reflected in different distortions of social realities. Methodological criticism in the historical sciences is criticism of the validity of the causal laws whch are expressed in methodological form.

The method of culture-areas, for example, is used by anthropologists to reconstruct the history of culture elements. This method is founded on the belief that as a cultural influence radiates from a center of origin, its effects diminish in proportion to the number of tribes through which it has passed.[14] The originating people, it is surmised, will meanwhile have developed more complex forms of the given cultural component. The Central Pueblos, for instance, are presumed to have been inventors of pottery; they make several varieties—uncolored, two-colored, and three-colored; the tribes on the margin of the Southwest, on the other hand, make only uncolored pottery, while those still farther

[13] Lyell held that the catastrophists indulged in arbitrary hypotheses "without feeling that by this assumption they pledged themselves to the opinion that ordinary forces and time could never explain geological phenomena." Their conjectures, he said, ignored the reiterative effect of observable processes, "a *vera causa*, a force and mode of operation which we know to be true." "I admit," he conceded, "the possiblity of these changes in the system, but they are mere arbitrary conjectures. I feel much more confidence in the probable uniformity in the conditions of the heavenly bodies . . ." *Life, Letters, and Journals of Sir Charles Lyell, Bart.*, London, 1881, Vol. II, pp. 4–6. Also cf. Robert H. Murray, *Science and Scientists in the Nineteenth Century*, London, 1925, pp. 39 ff.

[14] Cf. A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*, New York, 1923, pp. 188–189, 324.

beyond have no pottery at all. The latter tribes are regarded as successive borrowers of the Central Pueblos' invention. An effort is thus made to reconstruct the history of the development and diffusion of culture-traits through the use of the culture-area method. The inadequacies, however, of this method of historical reconstruction derive from the limitations in the assumed causal laws. It is not always true that the simplest forms of a technical innovation are found as we move from the center of origin to distant, peripheral borrowers. There are cases where a late-comer upon the cultural scene is enabled to adopt complex forms directly. German industry, for instance, during the latter part of the nineteenth century not only borrowed from but surpassed its earlier British model. As a late-comer, it borrowed only the most advanced technology, and was not hampered by an accumulated obsolescent plant and equipment.[15] Technical development was thus more complex away from the cultural origin. A methodological criticism is thus, at the same time, a criticism of a proposed social causal law.[16]

The analysis of an historical methodology is, then, at the same time an analysis of a system of sociological laws.[17] In this inquiry, no questions seem to me to arise concerning the "nature and ontological status of collective entities." The historical ontologist believes that historical knowledge is not explicable unless we make some commitment concerning the ontologic reality of "historical entities." He argues that if social institutions are defined in terms of the behavior of individuals, then the histories of such entities as the Catholic Church or the United States would not be knowable. This view seems to me to belie actual historical practice. Whether one is gathering materials on the history of popes, presidents, legislatures, statistics on inventions or westward population movements, one is gathering information about individuals and their relations to each other and their material environment. One can construct an ontology of "historical entities," but we may wonder whether such an ontology, like similar doctrines of the State, is more than a projective construction.

[15] Thorstein Veblen, *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution*, New York, 1915, pp. 181–188.

[16] Cf. especially the criticisms of the "culture-area" concept in *General Anthropology*, edited by Franz Boas, Boston, 1938, pp. 669–671.

[17] The terminology of "formal philosophy of history" and "material philosophy of history" does not seem to be helpful in elucidating this problem, and the questions of "priority" which it raises are, from the standpoint of our analysis of methodology, pointless. We can likewise not accept the notion of some scholars that there is an autonomous science of historical methodology. Methodological rules are the working counterpart of sociological laws.

Nor can I see in what sense questions of sociological ontology are involved in problems of sociological science. Sociologists like Kardiner are, for instance, concerned with the question of the extent to which basic personality structures of different societies are the outcome of different methods of infant care and child rearing. Empirical hypotheses, largely derived from Freud, guide this work, but it does not seem that it raises issues of sociological ontology.

The problems of contemporary historical experience take us rather to questions concerning the limits of prediction in the social sciences, the modifiability of institutions, and the possibility of cross-cultural value-judgments. Social action and philosophy of history may well have to work against a background of ontologic agnosticism.

The philosophy of history merges into the philosophy of the social sciences generally as we consider such questions as whether an overall law of human history is possible. Especially does it converge with ethics and anthropology in the analysis of such a doctrine as that of cultural relativity. When anthropologists like Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead hold that cross-cultural ethical judgments are impossible, they are proposing a thesis which is not derivative from their anthropologic researches but rather from an antecedently held philosophy of history. A determinate knowledge of the pattern of history is a deceptive goal, but philosophers of history might undertake to show that if human values are not underwritten by a law of history, neither is their realization altogether foreclosed. And something like the exploration of the common human values, which underlie the diverse repressions and expressions within different social systems, could be attempted. We might then know and work consciously for our values, instead of engaging in unconscious projection.

LEWIS S. FEUER

UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT

HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION AND CULTURE ANALYSIS[1]

I

IN relation to the preceding papers, I can view mine as tending toward a broadening of Professor Feuer's realism, and toward

[1] Paper read in a symposium on "What is philosophy of history?" at the 48th annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, at Bryn Mawr, December 28, 1951.

focusing more specifically some of the program which Professor Mandelbaum has formally justified. But I wish to begin with a somewhat different set of distinctions from those which Professor Mandelbaum sets forth.

I take philosophy of history to be a critical attempt to overcome confusions and prejudices in making good sense of historical events. Among the enterprises that contribute to the pursuit of this purpose, I distinguish four, which I shall call:

(1) scientific determination of historical events and conditions;
(2) historical interpretations;
(3) "philosophies of history;" and
(4) the philosophical consideration of history.

Each of these enterprises has some elements of autonomy; none is completely determined by the others. Yet none is wholly independent of the rest. They all properly advance in a productive interplay, and my paper aims to point to some vital features of such an interplay.

The term "history," whatever its further meaning, refers intentionally to actual events that have occurred in specific spatio-temporal relations. But the purpose of historical effort is not consummated in an attempt to reproduce the order and character of events in past times and places. It is an effort carried on with interest in some heritage and in the meanings and consequences of events. What Professor Mandelbaum says about "philosophy of history" being concerned with "meaning" in the sense of "import for man as a valuing being" applies also to interpretative historical work—even without bringing in "philosophy." Historical events always occur in specific relations and contexts, and can not be known without some meaningful reconstruction of these. But historical interpretation is not confined to the relations, contexts, and perspectives in which events have occurred. It may look, more or less extensively, before and after, and to do so is as generally characteristic of historical work as to search critically to determine original relations.

"Meaning" in historical events has multiple sources as these events relate to many significant patterns and problems. Such relating goes on indefinitely long, yielding an unfinished accumulation of meanings to be interpreted and reinterpreted. The rise of ancient Rome, the French Revolution, and the conditions of labor in the early factories had their original contexts in which they occurred and acquired certain specific characters. But their historical meaning or significance is not exhausted by reconstruc-

tion and interpretation of these contexts alone. It goes on accumulating still in new relations and in reviewing of the old.

With regard to the enterprise of determining as scientifically as possible (i.e., as reliably and accurately as possible) what happened at a particular time and place, I want to make just two points. This enterprise, though fraught with special and often insuperable difficulties, is not procedurally unique. Historical events stand in definite relations within various contexts, through which they are in part, and in principle at least, convincingly determinable. If we are not convinced that we know, for instance, what Socrates said at his trial, or why Jesus went up to Jerusalem, we make the distinction and add: according to Plato, or according to Mark, or according to some tradition. Cultures which attend little to such distinctions are said to confuse myth, legend, and history, and to care little for historical science.

My second point follows from the fact that scientific inquiry in recent times has taken on an increasingly coöperative character. As one contemporary physicist, Professor I. I. Rabi, has put it:

> Individual authority no longer possesses any force in the scientific tradition. No scientist however great his renown can mislead his fellow scientists for longer than it takes to check his observations or verify his conclusions and their consequences. [From "Science as a Way of Life," an address opening the academic year at Columbia University, September 1950.]

I contend that this statement applies to the scientific determination of historical events with as much force as to any field of inquiry. This will scarcely be questioned in the field of natural history, and in some respects the knowledge of events in the human past depends even more fully upon social relations (e.g., testimonies, reports, records, etc.) than does the reconstruction of events in the non-human world. But coöperation in the investigation of human events is greatly complicated by the variety of viewpoints, motives, and prejudices with which events are reported, and often more or less deliberately misrepresented or even fabricated. Both the need and the complex difficulties of coöperation in the determination of historical events can be seen spotlighted whenever the Senate undertakes to investigate the record of a General, or even of a Professor.

In much coöperative historical work, however, the comparison of inferences drawn from several independent lines of inquiry has reached great refinements. One group of striking examples is furnished by the dating of artifacts on the basis of geological, cultural, and physico-chemical evidence (e.g., Carbon 14 measurements). In general, the study of artifacts has been greatly ad-

vanced as an historical instrument by archaeologists and anthropologists in the last hundred years. Before this time classifications of "kinds of history," like Hegel's, took note almost exclusively of historical literature and literary criticism.

Critical coöperation can be as fruitful for interpreting the meaning of historical events as in determining much about their original occurrence. But if I am right in having said that much meaning arises in manifold and ongoing contexts, then one should not think of critical coöperation as a road to the standard and final interpretation of historical events. It would be more reasonable to expect interpretations still to vary, as new relations and perspectives develop. In a recent book on *Nature and Human Nature*, Mr. Lawrence K. Frank writes:

> Undoubtedly for centuries to come the historians . . . will be engaged in vigorous disputes over what did happen in the first half of the twentieth century and what it all meant. Just as there are various schools of thought about what we call the past, so those who come after us will almost surely differ widely in what they think about their past—our present. [Pp. 3–4.]

I want to add that if, contrary to this prediction of Mr. Frank's, some future period of culture were to arrive at agreement about the meaning of what happened in our era, this would not guarantee the superior wisdom, nor the finality and completeness of their interpretation. Their consensus too would have its specific conditions, to which its merits would be related. So whether we ever achieve "one world" in a cultural sense or not, the best chance of catching up the abundant and unfinished meaningfulness of historical events will still depend upon some ongoing plurality of well-founded interpretations. If there be those who argue that such a view in effect renders history meaningless, I suggest that what they call "meaninglessness" reflects in large part a bewilderment over what to make of such prolific riches of meaning as historical events breed.

At this point it seems pertinent to discuss the role of philosophers, or what can be done in a philosophical way to overcome bewilderment, confusions, prejudices, and other difficulties in making good sense of historical events whose abundance of meaning feeds so many different interpretations. To overcome such confusions and prejudices I take to be a generic function of philosophy of history, whatever else it may be.

Philosophers, I submit, have tried to help in two somewhat contrary, though not mutually exclusive, ways. They have sometimes tried to be radically and finally definitive with regard to historical interpretation—more so than many historians care to be. Along

this line they have produced various "philosophies of history," that is, more or less systematic attempts to define the essential meanings of historical events. The German word *Inbegriff*, i.e., an inclusive or summary conception, comes to mind as pertinent to such attempts. The names of Hegel, Marx, Spengler spring to mind, and then many others. In order to be truly philosophical the attempt to define essential meanings must aim, of course, to be critically and fundamentally grounded, that is, the evidence and reasons for the definition must be decisively marshaled. But the grounds adduced for seeing the essential meanings of history —for example, in the rise and decline of various cultures, or in the progressive realization of freedom, or in God's way with man— need not all be drawn from historical events themselves. "Philosophies of history" may properly, some would say must, appeal to knowledge of men and the world, and perhaps to faith, that is more than purely historical for their grounding.

To be distinguished from the foregoing, there is another philosophical way of helping historical interpretation. Instead of trying to be radically definitive of the essential meanings of historical events, philosophers may aim to be critically explorative, in order to help extend the discovery and appraisal of meanings. If the first emphasis tends to a construction of "philosophies of history," the second leads to what I call the philosophical consideration of history. The general method of such consideration is to keep reviewing historical events in terms of newly discovered contexts, relations, perspectives, and concepts. Its general aim is to assist human beings in culling, critically and reliably, a maximum of relevant meanings from their histories. Among modern European thinkers who have helped historical interpretation in this explorative way—rather than by "philosophies of history" with a definitive emphasis—the following come to mind as illustrative: Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Wilhelm Dilthey.

These two phases of philosophical enterprise, the definitive and the explorative, are not, of course, mutually exclusive. Despite their definitive emphasis, Hegel, Spengler, and certainly Marx shared in the exploration of contexts, and even of new contexts in the case of Marx notably. Where an explorative emphasis is dominant, there is nothing that will necessarily prevent a mind from reaching some definitive conclusions as to the essential meanings of historical events. But in such a case, if the explorative spirit is maintained, whatever definitive conclusions are reached will keep a hypothetical status, subject to further scrutiny. As exploration discloses hitherto unrecognized meanings of historical events, the logical effect upon "philosophies of history" will be

either to confirm them, in the degree to which they can assimilate the new material, or to reduce their significance to more limited but better justified proportions.[2]

There was a time when poets celebrated Newtonian science as revealing "the plan by which the universe was made." There was a more recent time when theories of evolution were accorded a similar inclusive significance. The advance of natural science leads us to estimate the value of Newtonian and Darwinian ideas in new relations and perspectives, but not to forget about them altogether. Should we not expect an analogous consequence from the advance of critical coöperation in historical interpretation? It seems reasonable to think that there are some rhythms and cycles in the history of cultures that can be quite accurately recognized as taking place compatibly with other accumulative and cross-cultural historical progressions. It may not be impossible to trace an evolution of certain institutions and at the same time to distinguish this from other aspects of the meaningful history of men and peoples.[3]

The effect of an explorative philosophical consideration of history, as it advances in the discovery of meanings, should not be to eliminate "philosophies of history" so much as to make possible a more sound estimate of the values and validities they may continue to claim with evidence. Moreover, my reference to natural science is not intended to imply that the significance of "philosophies of history" is to be found exclusively in their scientific qualities, i.e., in their relation to the growth of knowledge, alone. Attempts to render the essential meanings of historical events and circumstances can and do have their importance also as ideologies and as works of art, expressing in these forms some distinct sense

[2] In a little debate broadcast by the BBC in 1948, Professor Geyl of Utrecht questioned whether A. J. Toynbee could claim scientific knowledge of "*the pattern of the past*" as a result of his *Study of History*. To this Toynbee at one point replied: "I should be well content if it turned out that I had laid bare one genuine facet of history, and even then, I should measure my success by the speed with which my own work in my own line was put out of date by further work by other people in the same field." This evidence of Toynbee's sympathy with an accumulative view of historical understanding proves nothing, of course, with regard to the entirely separate question of how successfully he has "laid bare one genuine facet of history" in terms of the moral pattern he finds repeated in the fortunes of some twenty-one cultures. (Cf. *Can We Know the Pattern of the Past?* Discussion between P. Geyl & A. J. Toynbee, 1948, BBC.)

[3] I count it a merit of the American anthropologist, Leslie A. White, that he makes this distinction so clearly, although it remains open to much question whether a general evolution of culture can be traced as independently of the history of peoples and of their various psychologies as he thinks it can.

of heritage, interest, and destiny. They can be, as Professor Feuer puts it, good examples of "projective" systems. What I have called the philosophical consideration of history, especially when aided and abetted by culture analysis, has the power to advance comprehension of these functions of "philosophies of history" as well as to review their scientific claims and properties. Not only what a Hegel, a Marx, or a Spengler has found out about history, but the multiform significance of the kind of edifice he built and the different phases of its influence in history should become progressively evident through ongoing exploration and analysis.

I trust it is evident that by philosophical exploration I do not mean an indiscriminate accumulation of conclusions and opinions as they come off the press or over the air. I take for granted that philosophical inquiry always involves critical appraisal of ideas in the light of evidence and of aims. Both the formal and the material problems which Professor Mandelbaum lists will arise in each of the phases of philosophy of history, the definitive and explorative, which I have distinguished. I am glad to note his remark that both formal and material considerations are involved in attempting to deal with the "neglected problems" of a "critical social philosophy" to which he draws our attention. Apparently none of us in this discussion is focusing on problems which he claims are to be solved by purely formal or purely material considerations as such.

II

In the remainder of my paper I wish to consider the bearing on philosophy of history of the growth of culture analysis. In so doing, I shall also comment incidentally on some revived theological reflections on "the meaning of history," to which Professor Mandelbaum likewise makes reference.

The term "culture," as used today in social science and as I use it here, includes all the ways and conditions of living invented by human societies. During the past hundred years the analysis of man's cultural heritages and their variations has been scientifically, i.e., coöperatively and critically pursued, from many angles as never before. The historical context of this analysis has been one of profound cultural change and of expanding contacts between the different cultures of the world. I raise the question: what can philosophy of history derive from all this development in man's knowledge of his culture? What promise does it contain of helping us to overcome confusions and prejudices in making good sense of historical events? We may expect that different answers

will be given, and I wish myself to offer a twofold one, developing it very briefly in several respects.

Attempts have already been made (e.g., by Hegel, Marx, Spengler, and others) to support definitive "philosophies of history" with culture analysis. It is likely that more such attempts will continue to be made. Yet I think we should not expect culture analysis ever to dictate some single definitive interpretation of the essential meanings of historical events. Nevertheless, though culture analysis is not to be viewed as the road to some standard interpretation of history, I claim that it does offer the best central approach to what I have called the explorative philosophical consideration of history. In other words, the most continuously fruitful and trustworthy paths to accumulative knowledge and meaningful interpretation of historical events can be opened up by coöperative and critical study of culture.

The reason this can be affirmed is because "culture" is so pervasive a factor in human existence. Almost nothing, perhaps literally nothing that is distinctively human happens without its being conditioned by culture, i.e., by social tradition, learning, and invention. On the other hand, culture is too variable, and at the same time too incomplete an aspect of ongoing events, to dictate one and only one definitive "philosophy of history." I might state this twofold thesis metaphysically somewhat in the idiom of Spinoza. "Culture" is not a single, self-sufficient Entity or Substance like Spinoza's God. Yet it is so pervasive a constituent of human affairs that without culture nothing human can be, and without considering it nothing human is thoroughly understood.

To promote knowledge of the forms, changes, specific bearings and possibilities of tradition, learning, and invention is the general work of culture analysis. Such study takes us to the most meaningfully productive processes in man's history,—to the actualization of his potencies in various situations. We do not have to regard culture as *the* determiner of history—overlooking what may be claimed for nature, chance, genius, and God in that role—in order to allow that without culture nothing distinctively human is made and done. It follows that whatever we can find out about the operations of culture will have its relevance for interpreting historical events. I think there can be no doubt that coöperative and critical culture analysis, in the last few generations, has already enormously improved our understanding of what has happened in human history.

I am not so sanguine, however, that culture analysis as it advances, and develops in the ability to take into account many kinds

of relations (whether of ecology, technology, psychodynamics, ideology, and whatever else), will support one grand integration, enabling us to say: now we know *the pattern of the past*,—let alone to predict the pattern of the future, whether along the lines of Marx, Freud, Spengler, Toynbee, or someone yet unborn. No doubt such integrations will continue to be made and will be offered as more or less definitive "philosophies of history." I do not mean to question their interest and value, but only the extent to which they are likely to deserve the status of scientific assertions. Yet, I think we should become able to estimate "philosophies of history" of such integrative sweep more justly, as culture analysis accumulates understanding of the manifold patterns and relations in human affairs. We should, for instance, not have to accept or to dismiss *in toto*, but should be able in some accumulative way to discover what a system, like Marxism-Leninism, did comprehend and integrate of past, present, and future together with something of what it missed.

It may be further clarifying to comment briefly on some recent theological reflections. What must be said, from the point of view of my thesis, about the doctrine that "the meaning of history" is best interpreted from a Biblical and Christian perspective that makes central man's historical realization of himself as sinner and subject of Christian redemption? In the transcendent emphasis of this doctrine, in its professed aim to avoid absolutizing any of the cultural relativities of history, I think there is an important value. I agree that in the religious relation there can be an increment of meaning extending beyond the cultural into personal intimacies and into universal phases of reality that human societies have not invented. But I am frankly puzzled when "the meaning of history" is identified with these religious relations. What the theologians are talking about, it seems to me, is what they take to be the most crucial and universal meanings of life. And indeed, they often make it a point that their doctrine would remain the same even if many important historical events had not occurred or had been very different: for instance, if Greek science and the Industrial Revolution (to mention only two such details) had never arisen.

But is this playing cricket with the philosophical consideration of history? Should we not in this respect agree with Hegel that the key ideas of the philosophy of history must serve to illumine its major differentiations as well as its most common aspects? From this standpoint I submit that man's understanding of himself as a culture-builder can offer a more fertile central approach

to historical interpretation than his self-knowledge as a sinner, even though the latter can add something vital. A quite endless and inconclusive debate might be held, I presume, as to which is more threatening to human values: a cultural absolutism without profound religious perspective and humility, or a theological absolutism without progressive understanding of man's culture-shaping career and its possibilities.

The organization of human societies takes place largely in terms of culture, i.e., of tradition, learning, and invention, although socially organized behavior also involves other vital components besides the cultural. Human societies acquire cultures and largely constitute themselves in so doing. It is for this reason that I should like to think of my remarks and Professor Mandelbaum's as supplementary. Insofar as his "critical social philosophy" aims to throw light on "the changes in the life of specific societies" by understanding their organization and constitution, it shares this purpose with culture analysis. But I find myself a bit in the dark as to the kind of social structure implied in Professor Mandelbaum's frequent use of the terms "entity" and "ontological," and also as to why history can not contribute to basic knowledge of it along with social science. If he does imply some general metaphysics of human society, independent of man's capacity to learn, to transmit, to invent, in other words of his culture-building powers, then I would have to disagree with such a view as too a-historical.

During the last fifteen years the term "cross-cultural" has appeared rather frequently in the lingo of anthropology. I do not recall having seen an explicit definition of it, but it generally refers to studies of specific themes and problems as they appear in or are shared by more than one culture. Cross-cultural inquiry, as I see it, goes beyond comparative description and analysis of different culture patterns by exploring the way in which some theme, problem, or set of problems is affected by cultural differences. Before the anthropologists began to use the term, Max Weber gave an impressive illustration of such inquiry in his attempt to study how multiple factors in several historic cultures had advanced or retarded the development of a "rational economy." Georg Misch, in his book on *The Dawn of Philosophy*, conducted something of a cross-cultural inquiry into the rise of philosophic problems in ancient Greece, India, and China. I cite these examples, not so much to praise them, as to indicate that American anthropologists and psychologists in their recent studies of personality formation in various cultures have no monopoly,

or even priority, in the general development of cross-cultural inquiry.[4]

This type of inquiry is difficult, and in its present early stages more sketchy and groping than sure in its results. But its bearing upon a better understanding of human affairs, including historical interpretation and philosophical ideas, will deserve much future attention. It bears greatly upon the pursuit of adequate "objectivity," and on that overcoming of confusion and prejudice, which, in my view, philosophy of history has a major concern to advance. Doctrines of cultural and historical relativism will not disappear in the face of the findings of cross-cultural inquiry, but they are likely, I think, to be modified and moderated. For in such inquiry meanings and values continue to be explored in their relation to different culture patterns, but these in turn are examined in their bearings upon interests and problems that cross over many, or even all, cultural boundaries. Of course, if it should be concluded that the changing patterns of culture make no deep difference in the essential meanings of life, then, to be sure, cross-cultural analysis would not have the whole range of importance that it has if they do make such difference. And again, if various cultures are judged to constitute separate and isolated worlds of meaning, as they are for instance by Spengler, and it be held that one world exists only in a physical sense, then the universal of human history becomes a story of so many locally oriented groups more or less perpetually fighting and pushing each other about.

HORACE L. FRIESS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

COMMENTS ON THE SYMPOSIUM "WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY?"

THE three papers presented in this symposium on "What is Philosophy of History?" discuss many points. On certain of these points they represent different views. Four of these points are here selected for criticism.

1. All three of the papers agree in maintaining that certain classic philosophies of history, like Hegel's and Marx's, are in-

[4] I take this opportunity to call attention to Laura Thompson's account in *Personality and Government*, 1951, of a series of coöperative cross-cultural studies on Indian personality and government. The cross-cultural studies of Abram Kardiner and of Margaret Mead on personality development and on sex themes are better known, as are also some of the cross-cultural inquiries sponsored by UNESCO.

adequate. Professor Feuer calls such philosophies "projective propositions," that is, propositions which ascribe to the world generally the values cherished by their authors. Professor Mandelbaum says much the same thing. He accuses such authors of justifying their philosophies to themselves by the emotional response which their philosophies elicit, and thereby of confusing quite subjective personal feelings with "a standard of evaluation for history." Professor Friess is no less critical, but more generous; and in this case generosity is, I think, more just. He points out that even the inadequate interpretations, interpretations which are inadequate just because they intend to summarize what Hegel calls "the grand argument of human existence," are yet fruitful as tentative explorations of selected aspects of historical events. Professor Feuer, in my judgment, is too hasty and too harsh. He overstates a good point when he writes that "interpretations of history . . . abound because of our inability to confirm any given one of them." We can not indeed confirm their total truth, because they are not wholly true. But we can confirm them in the sense of testing them, seeing where they do throw light on events and where they so fail. Interpretations of history *ought* to abound if there is in the course of events no one omnipresent pattern. Each of the classic philosophies of history, even if inadequate to the whole course of events, may yet record, and record correctly, some pattern which may be found, along with other patterns, here and there within the course of events. The critic of these philosophies, however, must not be too generous: he is not entitled to claim that the more interpretations, the merrier. For some interpretations may be really false, entirely false or almost entirely false. And, against Professor Friess, I should so regard the philosophies of Toynbee and Niebuhr, a judgment not here justified but one in which, I believe, Professor Feuer would agree with me.

2. The three papers before us agree further in bringing forward suggestions of new, analytically derived concepts which the respective authors of the papers hope will prove fruitful in fresh examinations of the nature and meanings of history. Professor Mandelbaum wants to use concepts of "collective entities," such as a church or a nation or an economic system, and he thinks that such concepts may be obtained from what he calls "a critical social philosophy." Professor Friess would promote the application to history of ideas reached in "cultural analysis" and "cross-cultural inquiry." Professor Feuer urges the use of what he considers more "realistic" considerations, the use, that is, of laws carefully formulated in the social sciences. Now these three suggestions are

not, in principle, mutually exclusive possibilities for sound procedure, and Professors Mandelbaum and Friess recognize this fact. Professor Mandelbaum states that his favored concepts will prove to be but "*one* of the bases" (italics mine) for the interpretation of history; and Professor Friess is ready to employ multiple approaches to the complex materials of history. Professor Feuer dismisses Professor Mandelbaum's suggestion about the need of understanding "collective entities," and Professor Friess expresses suspicions concerning that suggestion. But since Professor Mandelbaum has not had time to work out his ambitious project, its dismissal seems premature. Professor Mandelbaum refers to his project as "an ontology," and this word seems to be what makes the other two writers in the symposium hostile or cautious. There are of course ontologies and ontologies, and doubtless many of them are poor things. But the word ontology ought not to be used invidiously. An ontology of collective entities would be, I presume, an analysis of what collective entities genuinely are. And such an ontology of collective entities is just what economists and political scientists are trying to give when they discuss the nature of labor unions or the state. Individuals-as-members-of-organized-groups behave differently from individuals who are not such members, so that there is clearly a legitimate sense in which an ontology of collective entities is requisite to the study of history. We ought not to dismiss Professor Mandelbaum's project now. We can afford to wait for the future to throw light on what kind of analysis of collective entities Professor Mandelbaum is seeking.

3. Professor Mandelbaum makes what I consider an extremely important point when he says that material philosophies of history are of two "fundamentally different" types. He calls these types the linear and the morphological. The linear type, if I may use my language and not his (though I hope and think I am fair to his position), seeks to deal with the events of history collectively, that is, to enunciate an interpretation which is not meant to be true of any one of them singly but is meant to be true of them in their total interrelationships. The morphological type, by contrast, seeks to deal with the events of history distributively, that is, to enunciate an interpretation which is not meant to be true of them in their total interrelationships but is meant to be true of them singly or each in turn.

Now in the light of this important and, as it seems to me, sound distinction, I wish to comment on each of the three papers. My comment on Professor Mandelbaum's paper is really a query. When Professor Mandelbaum comes to the culmination of his

paper and treats of the possibility of using the concepts of a critical social philosophy for the interpretation of history, to which type of material philosophy of history does he think his procedure will lead? I should myself suppose that it could properly lead to only the morphological type, that is, to a generalized theory of the nature of an event—to what, in my language, I should call a metaphysics of natural change. But Professor Mandelbaum's language, if I understand it aright, indicates that he hopes it will lead, and lead successfully, to a material philosophy of history of the linear type. If so,—and I dismiss my criticism of Professor Mandelbaum if this understanding is wrong—Professor Mandelbaum ought to regard the material philosophy of history he is seeking as exposed to exactly the same charges of subjectivity which he brings against all the classic material philosophies of history. He ought so to regard it, that is, unless he is sponsoring a completely monistic position. For only on the supposition that the world is of one pattern in its total order, can any morphological philosophy of history be the entire truth about that world. And if the world had one inclusive pattern,—and I happen to believe that we already know enough about the world to say that it is not one in this sense—what conceivable grounds have we for supposing that the new approach of Professor Mandelbaum, even when it is supplemented by other approaches, will unlock the ultimate secret of the universe?

Professor Friess' paper deals, so far as I see, with only linear philosophies of history. I do not complain: no one can do all things in thirty minutes. He does distinguish the cyclical theory (e.g., Toynbee's) from the more completely monistic theory which regards the whole sweep of history as tending to one final consummation. But the cyclical theory still takes long periods of history as bound together collectively by a recurrent pattern. Professor Friess does not bar out the possibility of a genuinely morphological philosophy of history, nor does he explicitly discuss the nature of that kind of philosophical enterprise. He sticks to his central thesis: namely, that linear philosophies of history have considerable value when taken, not in their definitive emphasis, but in their explorative bearings. And this point, as a corrective of any tendency to dismiss linear philosophies of history cavalierly, is decidedly worth making.

Professor Feuer's paper is perhaps nearer than either of the others to developing the possibilities of a morphological philosophy of history. The first section of his paper is concerned, as I have said above, with adverse criticism of linear philosophies. The

second section of his paper defends a procedure which, though he does not explicitly draw the contrast, would lead, I think, to a morphological philosophy of history. He could, I think, have strengthened his second section by defining the difference of aim and of procedure between what he rejects in the first section and sponsors in the second section of his paper.

4. My fourth and last point concerns the way in which the three papers in the symposium answer a fundamental query about history. The query is this: What is the purport of the statement, in any material philosophy of history, that history has such-and-such meaning or meanings? Professor Friess is the only one of the three writers who deals explicitly and fully with this query. Professor Feuer seems in accord with the position of Professor Friess, though he happens not to deal with the point at length. But Professor Mandelbaum seems implicitly to take an opposed attitude.

Professor Friess gives an answer, and, I think, a correct answer, to this query when he says that the method for the philosophical consideration of history is "to keep reviewing historical events in terms of newly discovered contexts, relations, perspectives, and concepts." The meanings of history lie, then, in the way in which information about the past enables us to deal with events now going on or still to occur. The meanings of any single past event may, in this case, vary from time to time, as the situation we actually face changes. The meanings of historical events are, in Professor Friess' phrase, "explorative." And thus considered, these meanings can be tested—some will be found true, some false, some partly true and partly false. These meanings, moreover, are of different sorts. Sometimes they are primarily aesthetic in purport: that is, our view of the past will give us "some distinct sense of heritage, interest, and destiny." Sometimes they are more utilitarian or practical in purport: that is, our view of the past will instruct us concerning methods by which we may best deal with the affairs of our present world. In both types of case, the meanings of history are verifiable, at least in principle, in the same way in which any medical prescription or any piece of advice is verifiable. That is, the meanings of history are evaluations—evaluations which have at once a reference to the past (which reference therefore can be examined for its accuracy) and a reference to the future that is coming into being (which reference therefore can be examined for its pertinence and adequacy).

The alternate to Professor Friess' position on this point is that the meanings of history lie in the past as flies lie on fly-paper on

a hot summer day. Then these meanings would have to be treated dialectically rather than exploratively: that is, the concepts we use for the "base" of our interpretation of the meanings of history would remain "assumptions" we import into history because we like them, rather than become hypotheses we use or abandon because we find them fruitful or fruitless in our use of them. Then we would have to speak of the "validity" of our results rather than of their truth or their empirical confirmation. Then, too, we would have to limit the number of concepts in terms of which enlightening comments could be made upon history to some set which could be brought together into a consistent deductive schematism, instead of seeing incompatible concepts as perhaps all alike true, some now, some then, in the shifting interrelationships of the past with successive and varying presents.

STERLING P. LAMPRECHT

AMHERST COLLEGE

THE papers by Professors Mandelbaum, Feuer, and Friess are rich in insights and suggestions. Since it is obviously impossible to comment in a few minutes on all the problems they have elucidated, I will limit myself to pointing out three issues which appear to be common to all.

It seems to me that the main questions involved are:

(1) What does the expression "philosophy of history" mean?
(2) Can philosophy of history become an objective science?
(3) Can the social sciences, or a critical social philosophy, or an exploratory cultural inquiry (as Professors Mandelbaum, Feuer, and Friess respectively propound) be foundational sciences for a philosophical analysis of history?

Question (1) is not trivial. It is, indeed, a more formal way of stating the general problem raised in this symposium. Question (2) depends entirely upon it. For this reason, I will examine them at the same time. Question (3) will be given less attention, although I am convinced that it can become a real headache for philosophers.

The answer to question (1) is not easy. We could, indeed, say: "philosophy of history" means a systematic reflection on the historical data provided by historians. Although this definition seems to be, and probably is, dull and scantily informative, it contains a problem much discussed by philosophers: the problem of whether "reflection" as such is capable of giving information

about reality. Let us pass over it as a cumbersome question. Let us suppose that reflective thought is productive, at least in the way psychologists talk about productive thinking. Then "philosophy of history" will mean something analogous to "philosophy of science." On the one hand, it will deal with the so-called presuppositions of a given science and will become a formal discipline. On the other hand, it will deal with the whole of science and will become a material discipline. In the first case, its most successful tool will be analysis; in the second case, synthesis. Now, Professor Mandelbaum has proved, I think, to our entire satisfaction that the division of philosophy of history into a formal and a material conception is scarcely convincing. I would go even further: the above division, if accepted, is not understood in the same way by all philosophers and, therefore, is utterly confusing. Suppose, for example, that philosophy of history is conceived primarily as a formal discipline. In that case some philosophers will say that it must deal with such questions as historical objectivity, reliability of documents, etc., while others will argue that the questions involved are mainly of the following type: essence of historical objects, analysis of human existence, etc. Under the name *formal* we will be offered different types of research—indeed, different specimens of philosophies. The same thing happens if we assume that philosophy of history is predominantly a material discipline. Some philosophers will contend that it has to do with different types of societies, while others will retort that no philosophy of history is worth the name unless it depicts in a grandiose way "the march of the historical cosmos as a whole." The disagreement on this latter point seems to be less grave that the disagreement on the former. But, as I will point out later, it is not. Is it, therefore, impossible to answer question (1) unless we previously accept a given philosophy?

I would be inclined to say "yes," and would adhere to Professor Mandelbaum's contention that a philosophy of history cannot escape raising problems about the ontological status of historical entities, and, therefore, cannot escape making certain "ultimate" assumptions. I think, however, that the word "ontological" proves rather to be a nuisance in a world that has decided to follow the well-known device of giving new names to old ways of thinking. Therefore, I will commit myself less certainly on this point than does Professor Mandelbaum. I shall simply say that if historical entities must enjoy an ontological status, they do so only in so far as they depend upon a previous convention about the language we are going to use when discussing philosophically historical topics.

To be sure, the meaning of the word "language" in my context is extremely vague. But as we are not now in a session of the Association for Symbolic Logic, I hope you will not be too fussy about it. "Language" here means simply the set of words we are going to use *consistently* for a given intellectual purpose. I know that the vagueness of this definition makes it very difficult to ascertain differences between "languages" in philosophy of history. But an example will perhaps suffice to convey my meaning. A language in which the word "significance" (in Professor Mandelbaum's sense) occurs, is not, in my opinion, of the same "kind" as one in which that word is ruled out as meaningless. Not all words, of course, enjoy this property of permitting us to make such distinctions; only certain crucial words do the job adequately. Now, the language used depends to a considerable extent upon the questions we raise. A language built in order to answer the question "What is the meaning (significance) of human history as a whole?" requires certain terms that are excluded from languages answering such questions as: "What is the nature of society?" or "Do our conceptions of history influence the course of historical events?" In some cases, we must introduce words such as "progress," "decadence," "crisis," and, in general, value-terms. In other cases we may dispense with such words, but will have to introduce expressions like "subject-object relation," "indeterminacy," "interindividuality," etc. It might be argued that the above distinctions follow the line of the rejected division between a formal and a material conception of history. They do not. Even within the so-called material conception, Spengler and Toynbee use one language, whereas Hegel, Marx, and Spencer use another. The notion of *cultural forms,* for instance, is indispensable for Spengler, but not necessarily for Spencer. We could give additional examples, but I think that the above will suffice. After all, it is dangerous for philosophers to rely too much on examples.

In this point question (1) relates closely to question (2). How is an objective (or, in Professor Feuer's terminology, a "realistic") philosophy of history possible if the choice of terms depends upon a previous convention, and if this convention is determined by what we are going to ask about history? Is this not precisely our question what must be accepted as meaningful, or ruled out as meaningless? Will philosophy of history not become incurably subjective in that case?

To this I answer that no philosophy of history can escape being, up to a certain point, subjective. It is so in two ways. First, we cannot entirely escape conditions derived from psychological

structure, from dependence upon a cultural area or a social class *when we formulate statements involving these factors.* Second, if we suppose these subjective disturbances to be non-existent or irrelevant, there is still a certain amount of decision (which, in our field, I cannot conceive except as a decision by somebody) in the choice of language. You may argue that it is not a question of *somebody,* but of *something,* and that the exclusion of certain expressions from the language of the philosophy of history is determined only by facts. This I would gladly admit if I knew what historical facts are, or rather what kind of statements denote historical facts. The statement "Philip II of Spain became angry on a certain day of 1588 when the news was received that the Armada had been defeated" seems to be a historical fact. But what about the statement "Philip II was a staunch defender of the Catholic faith"? I am inclined to think that it is also a historical fact; otherwise, the reading of historical texts would become an extremely dull exercise. Nevertheless, in order to formulate the latter type of statement, I need a historical "language" of a more "liberal" kind than that required by the former type of statement. And when we consider the "facts" dealt with by philosophers of history, we are less reluctant to admit that linguistic conventions are at least as determinant as the facts themselves. Therefore, I quite heartily agree with Professor Feuer that in philosophy of history we must eliminate our wishes. I doubt, however, that we can eliminate our language.

This leads us to question (3), which has been most thoroughly discussed by Professor Feuer, but to which Professors Mandelbaum and Friess have also made substantial contributions. I have not much time left for this problem, so that my treatment of it will be exceedingly sketchy. It can be reformulated in this way: if the traditional philosophies of history are unable to cope with so many problems and cannot attain the status of a rigorous science, would it not be better to dismiss them altogether and to build instead a new science?

I admit that a very good way of getting rid of old problems is to look for new ones. Professors Mandelbaum, Feuer, and Friess have understood this quite well. They all agree on the solution; they differ only in the ways of achieving it. I think that their views on this point are very sound, and I am personally inclined to accept them. The use of social sciences for the understanding of history is very fruitful; and, scientifically, less jeopardizing than any other method. It presents, however, some flaws, of which I will point out only one. If all societies obey fundamentally the same laws, is it not more accurate to abandon altogether the word

"history"? For history implies that there are basic differences among societies or ages, and I would see no great difference between Egyptian society of the XVIII dynasty and contemporary North American society if our talk were restricted to the social sciences' vocabularly. Neither would I see any great difference between Indo-Chinese art of the IV Century A.D. and Spanish Baroque art of the XVII Century, if the evolution of artistic forms were explained only in terms of the well-known law about the passage from simplicity to complexity, and vice versa. Again: if things worked as wonderfully in history as the social sciences suggest, how could we possibly explain that certain cultural productions, although *in principle* common to all human beings, are developed by some societies considerably more than by others? Why do peoples in the same economic, geographic, and social conditions diverge so that one people produces natural sciences and another does not, one is capable of mirroring life dramatically and the other is not? These are, I admit, very thorny questions and probably cannot be answered very scientifically. Therefore, although I accept social sciences in Professor Feuer's sense of the term, a critical social philosophy in Professor Mandelbaum's sense, or a cultural exploratory analysis in Professor Friess's sense, as very powerful tools for the understanding of history, I still think that there should be room for a philosophy of history, whatever the meaning of the term may be. Perhaps it means only a set of wild hypotheses, based upon facts provided by historians, and upon laws tested by social scientists. Even in that case, I would think it of great value. At any rate, it is most probable that whatever we decide here, philosophies of history will continue to pour from philosophers. They will not be a nuisance at all. If a new Marx, or a new Spengler, or a new Toynbee appears, we all will be happy to stop arguing for a while about the definition of the expression "philosophy of history," and will sit down to enjoy whatever mixture of muddling inconsistencies and genial insights they wish to offer us.

JOSÉ FERRATER-MORA

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

SINCE my paper was unduly long, I wish to make only a few brief remarks concerning the other two papers and the comments of Professors Lamprecht and Ferrater-Mora.

1. I wish to correct what I take to be a misapprehension on the part of Professor Ferrater-Mora. He interpreted my paper as holding that a formal philosophy of history cannot be developed in

independence of a material philosophy of history. This interpretation I should reject. It was my contention that both the formal and the material consideration of history involve certain common problems which I have termed the problems of a Critical Social Philosophy. However, this is merely to state that an adequately grounded theory in either branch of the philosophy of history depends upon seeking a reasoned conclusion regarding these problems. It may be the case (and, as Professor Lamprecht noted, I am inclined to believe that it *is* the case) that a material philosophy of history of either the linear or the morphological type is not a valid philosophical enterprise, no matter how many genial insights it may contain. If this were true, then one could surely construct an adequate formal philosophy of history without a material philosophy of history, although—let me repeat—one could not do so without a tenable philosophical theory of the nature of societal facts.

2. I should reject Professor Lamprecht's remark that I probably wish to hold a material philosophy of history of the linear type. He is quite right in saying that my opinions commit me to a distributive rather than a collective view of history. Therefore, if I *were* to attempt to construct a material philosophy of history it could not be of the linear type. However, I should reject the necessity for any material philosophy of history, as that term was defined in my paper.

3. Professor Lamprecht is correct in stating that my opinion regarding the nature of historical knowledge differs radically from that to which he and Professor Friess would hold. I *do* hold that the facts of the past are fixed, as dead flies on fly-paper, and I do not believe that Professor Lamprecht's argument based on the distinctions between validation and empirical confirmation, and between assumptions and hypotheses, refutes this view. But that is another matter. What I should like to call your attention to is the fact that both Professor Friess and Professor Feuer make certain assumptions in the field of the formal philosophy of history, but neither has defined our general topic in such a way as to include its problems within the scope of our symposium. Yet their papers suggest that they take quite different views on the question of the objectivity of historical knowledge and on the place of valuation and scientific generalization in the work of the historiographer. The problems of a formal philosophy of history are not, then, dead; and I consider it one of the merits of Professor Lamprecht's lucid comments that he called this fact to our attention.

4. Both Professors Friess and Feuer find it puzzling that I should regard those problems whose existence I have tried to

suggest as "ontological" problems. However, I fail to see how one can discuss problems in the philosophy of science without in the end raising fundamental ontological problems.

These problems were not raised in Professor Friess's paper, since he was only concerned with the general relation of the study of culture to the problem of a material philosophy of history. The ontological problems to which I allude would only arise when one starts to analyze what are the constitutive elements in a culture, or how cultural uniformities and variations are to be explained. However, it seems to me that Professor Feuer should have taken cognizance of these problems; that he only escaped doing so by assuming a unity in the concepts and practices of the social sciences which does not in fact exist. For example, there is a profound difference between the causal explanation of the content of a culture in terms of psychological concepts such as those used by Kardiner, and a causal explanation in the purely sociological (non-psychological) terms of Marx. I do not believe that it is presumptuous on the part of a philosopher to raise problems as to whether one such set of concepts is better warranted than another, nor to ask how—if both are warranted—they may be related to one another. As the example of philosophic discussions of the problem of mechanism, vitalism, and emergence clearly shows, such topics do not fall outside the range of a philosophy of the natural sciences. I see no reason why a strictly analogous discussion of the adequacy of alternative basic assumptions in the social sciences should be considered suspect.

Or, to use another example, I think that it can be demonstrated that the different uses to which the concept of "functionalism" has been put by different anthropologists spring primarily from differences in what are taken to be the constitutive elements of a society. The examination of why these differing views should be held will, I submit, show that the anthropologists themselves make certain ontological assumptions. I see no reason why the validity of these variant assumptions should not be the object of philosophic inquiry.

5. It seems to me unfortunate that all three of the papers in this symposium represented (though each in a differing degree) a rejection of the belief in the adequacy of any material philosophy of history. I believe that a philosophic case can be made to justify such a rejection, but only Professor Feuer's paper attempted to do this. It was therefore fortunate that Professors Lamprecht and Ferrater-Mora sought to temper our remarks; but neither, I should suggest, makes a defense of the proposition that a material philoso-

phy of history can elucidate any final truth about man's place in nature or about man's historical experience. In this, I am afraid, no one of the five of us represents an acceptance of the tradition which we have discussed.

MAURICE MANDELBAUM
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

BOOK REVIEW

The New Perspective; an Essay. RUDOLF JORDAN. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1951. v, 316 pp. $5.00.

"Philosophy is the attempt to comprise all available knowledge, then to forget it and eventually to gain a correct world view which will result in active wisdom. The difficult part of it is the forgetting." With these words Rudolf Jordan, educated in philosophy at Heidelberg, and now farming in South Africa, begins his quest for a world view "in the spirit of our century and not of the last one." He finds most philosophers so preoccupied with abstractions inherited from past controversies that they are unable to see what modern science has revealed to them. "The great fault of all philosophy in the past has been exaggerated simplification." It is a great mistake "to expect anywhere in nature a simple and logical development. If anything in nature all around us is missing, it is a straight line" (pp. 58–59).

To remedy matters, Mr. Jordan proposes "much less abstraction and much less use of principles" in adhering more closely to what he calls the "factual" world about us. The modern problem is to "find a workable view of this very factual world around us and with us in it, to gain the right perspective in our mental and practical approach to this world around us and to our fellow-men in it. Philosophy is the art of viewing the world in the right perspective . . .," giving to "each event, each situation, and each problem its correct value" (pp. 11–12).

Once this correct perspective is attained, it follows that "the whole phenomenon of idealism will have lost all claim to serious consideration," but in its place will be found not materialism but "factualism." The factual world in which we live consists of the macrocosm, "that part of the world which we can experience with our senses, aided and unaided"; the microcosm, "the world below the atom"; and the megalocosm, "the world beyond the solar system." Our knowledge of microcosmic and megalocosmic forces "is very considerable, but it has to enter our nervous center at all times by macrocosmic means and in macrocosmic guise" entailing

some distortion. Our inability to handle the new knowledge of the very vast and the very tiny has made those realms seem mysterious and even supernatural; but "megalocosm and microcosm are fields for research and not for faith" (pp. 16–17, 32).

The macrocosmic world we inhabit is five-dimensional: the three spatial dimensions, time, and individuality, "all five inseparably connected." All abstractions are macrocosmic, individual, discontinuous events in our brains, "they are never the facts themselves," and should not be overvalued. Concepts must be our servants, never our masters. An example of the sad consequences of disregarding this advice is seen in the current abuse of "strict and repeatable causality," which appears "as a local exception rather than as a rule in a five-dimensional world . . . individualized through and through." Such a world is discontinuous, a rolling stone "does not influence Mars or Venus, not even a bit of air a few feet away; it influences merely a certain limited area around it." Where two quite independent chains of causality meet, we have an "accident," the facts of which "are never given and never known." Accidents which have happened in the past "do not become causal through the mere passing of time. The temptation to view all past events as the inevitable outcome of causally connected events must be withstood." Mr. Jordan recognizes that "this is indeed the point where we differ from all previous philosophy," since he denies flatly that "the impossibility of predicting the future correctly is due only to the lack of knowledge of all premises and conditions." Just as the three parts in ten thousand of carbon dioxide in the earth's atmosphere "make all the difference between life and death" for our species, so the three parts in ten thousand "of universal randomness within the strict laws and rules of our globe make out of all life on earth what it is: a matter of rules and accidents; a matter of chances and contingencies, with a hard core of causality; a matter of definite probabilities and frequent surprises" (pp. 78, 80, 97, 99).

In the four chapters dealing with the earth and man, we discover that "life is an exception in the existence of the earth, something special, very legitimate but not ordinary, small but tough, qualitatively different from everything else"; and exactly the same words are used to describe man's position relative to the rest of living things. "Within some three hundred generations, out of perhaps a few hundred thousand specimens of *Homo sapiens*, there have evolved the teeming masses of *Homo sapiens socialis*," a change which "has not yet been appreciated philosophically." In the last five generations alone, the species has increased "more than fivefold in numbers and about as much in intellectual powers." Yet there

have been severe losses as well as gains: "many skills and crafts have been won and lost again, often quite accidentally." The worst vice of Western man has been his exaggerated predilection for empty abstractions. The cure is "to start from the facts again and again and to take them as they are without prejudiced valuation" (pp. 207, 209, 219, 225–226).

The main theme of the closing chapters of reflective aphorisms concerning values, freedom, sex, art, science, and adjustments is the vast shift from emphasis upon the numerical increase of the species to greater freedom and greater intellectual specialization among men. "Any such change in the accentuation of moral aims encounters strong forces of inertia, and the result is a time of troubles and tensions. If we now add the fact that science has brought the various subspecies of men into close contact and rivalry, we are rather surprised at the general moderation and good sense of so many men on earth." Human beings today are "like children who have been playing in the mud so far, baking some very fine pies, and who are now sitting down to their first picture-book. The temptation is great to try to bake mud pies out of it. Yet this temptation ought to be resisted. It would be an error, for the new world demands a different approach" (pp. 303, 311).

In spite of his persistent use of "correctness" as a criterion throughout, and his tendency to use abstraction as a whipping-boy, Mr. Jordan has written a stimulating essay on the sins of philosophers as seen by one who finds "more philosophy in some of the geographical magazines than in most of the philosophical ones."

HAROLD A. LARRABEE

UNION COLLEGE

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Mr. Haraszti, Keeper of Rare Books and Editor of Publications at the Boston Public Library, has reproduced in this volume, with notes and continuity, the marginalia found in John Adams' copies of works by Bolingbroke, Rousseau, Frederick the Great, Voltaire, D'Alembert, De Mably, Turgot, Nedham, Condorcet, Napoleon, Priestley, Robespierre, and others. It is a useful compilation of sources for a future study of the development of Adams' political philosophy.

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Plea, by the famous French Catholic novelist, poet, and playwright, for a "democratic Christianity" and against Pharisaism, "lower" forms of worship, and some other abuses in the Catholic Church.

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GREGORIANUM. Vol. XXXII, 4, 1951. Especially: *G. Jarlot:* K. Marx et la dialectique du travail aliéné. *G. Klubertanz:* The Influence of Evolutionary Theory upon American Thought.—Vol. XXXIII, 1, 1952. Especially: *C. Boyer:* Relazione tra il progresso filosofico, teologico, dogmatico.

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THE HIBBERT JOURNAL. Vol. L, No. 1, Oct. 1951. *T. Corbishley:* Do the Mystics Know? *H. L. Stewart:* Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Barth: A Sequence. *R. Gregor Smith:* Kierkegaard's Library. *Philip Leon:* Existentialism and Objectivity. *Daisy L. Hobman:* The Need for Stillness. *W. Stacey Johnson:* Sin and Salvation in Hawthorne. *K. M. Hamilton:* The Road Back to Ruskin. *S. G. F. Brandon:* History's Challenge to Theology. *Denys Parsons:* Horse-Sense or Nonsense? *F. H. Heinemann:* Spiritual Leadership in an Age of Disbelief.—Vol. L, No. 2, Jan. 1952. Especially: *Sir John Stewart-Wallace:* The World Religions One in Mysticism. *P. S. Maclellan:* Professor Ryle and the Concept of Mind. *Peter Munz:* Sum Qui Sum. *J. Heywood Thomas:* The Idea of Creation. *Arthur E. Bell:* Towards a New Humanism. *Bernhard Mollenhauer:* Horizons of the Occidental Mind. *Albert G. Van Eyken:* Blind Progress. *Geoffrey Bowker:* The Problem of the Good Profane.

THE HUMANIST. Vol. XI, No. 2, March-April 1951. Especially: *Jerome Nathanson:* Humanism and Ethical Culture. *Lawrence K. Frank:* Potentialities of Human Nature. *H. J. Blackham:* Humanism and the Ethical Movement in England.—Vol. XI, No. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1951. Especially: *Hector Hawton:* Humanism: The Third Way. *Wayne Burns:* The Scientific Humanism of Alex Comfort. *Surindar S. Suri:* Science, Values, and General Semantics.—Vol. XII, No. 1, Jan.-Feb. 1952. Especially: *M. C. Otto:* In Defense of Secularism. *Ralph Barton Perry:* Catholic Americanism: An Ambiguous Answer.

JOURNAL DE PSYCHOLOGIE NORMALE ET PATHOLOGIQUE. 45e année, N° 1, jan.-mars 1952. Especially: *Y. Le Grand:* Structures et explication biologiques. *Paul Guillaume:* Le rôle de la structure dans l'invention. *P. Diel:* La théorie des archétypes chez C. G. Jung.

THE JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM. Vol. X, No. 3, March 1952. *Walter Abell:* Toward a Unified Field in Aesthetics. *Creighton Gilbert:* Degas and the Problem of Verifi-

able Excellence. *Helmut Hungerland:* Perception, Interpretation, and Evaluation. *Henry Leland Clarke:* The Basis of Musical Communication. *Van Meter Ames:* The Humanism of Thomas Mann. *Charles G. Hoffman:* Whitehead's Philosophy of Nature and Romantic Poetry. *Luis Monguió:* The Social Status of the Spanish Novelists in the Nineteenth Century. *Oscar Reutersvärd:* The Accentuated Brush Stroke of the Impressionists.

THE JOURNAL OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC. Vol. 16, No. 4, Dec. 1951. *G. Kreisel:* On the Interpretation of Non-Finitist Proofs—Part I. —Vol. 17, No. 1, March 1952. *Andrzej Mostowski:* On Direct Products of Theories. *Alan Rose:* An Extension of Computational Logic. *Haskell B. Curry:* The System LD. *G. Kreisel:* On the Interpretation of Non-Finitist Proofs—Part II.

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS. Vol. XIII, No. 1, Jan. 1952. *Jonathan Bishop:* Knowledge, Action, and Interpretation of Defoe's Novels. *Paul O. Kristeller:* The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics (II). *Lester G. Crocker:* Discussion of Suicide in the 18th Century. *Herbert M. Schueller:* The Use of Decorum of Music as Described in British Literature. *Gerhard Masur:* Wilhelm Dilthey and the History of Ideas. *D. A. Rees:* Kant's "Philosophy of the Human Understanding" and the Classification of the Sciences. *Moses Hadas:* Recent Work in Ancient Politics.

THE KENYON REVIEW. Vol. XIV, No. 1, Winter 1952. *Especially: Francis Fergusson:* Philosophy and Theatre in *Measure for Measure.*—Vol. XIV, No. 2, Spring 1952. Dante Number. *T. S. Eliot:* A Talk on Dante. *Charles S. Singleton:* The Other Journey. *Erich Auerbach:* Farinata and Cavalcante. *Francis Fergusson:* Purgatory, Canto XVIII: The Fruit of Philosophy. *Allen Tate:* The Symbolic Imagination. *Robert Fitzgerald:* The Style That Does Honor. *R. P. Blackmur:* Dante's Ten Terms for the Treatment of the Treatise. *Jacques Maritain:* Dante's Innocence and Luck. *John Crowe Ransom:* Why Critics Don't Go Mad.

LES LANGUES MODERNES. 46e année, N° 1, jan. 1952. Especially: *J.-J. Anstett:* A propos d'une étude de K. Barth sur Lessing. *E. Seauve:* L'actualité de Spengler.

METHODOS. Vol. III, No. 11, 1951. *Abraham Kaplan* and *Hermann F. Schott:* A Calculus for Empirical Classes. *Dalberto Faggiani:* Sulla struttura della fisica. *Hao Wang:* Arithmetic Models for Formal Systems. *Alan Rose:* An Axiom System for

Three-Valued Logic. *Norman M. Martin:* A Note on Sheffer Functions in N-Valued Logic. *Jean Piaget:* A propos d'un Traité de Logique.

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN. Vol. XXIX, No. 1, Nov. 1951. *Etienne Gilson:* Historical Research and the Future of Scholasticism. *Fernand Van Steenberghen:* Siger of Brabant. *Paul Colaço:* The Absolute of Human Reason in the Philosophy of Aurobindo. *Germain G. Grisez:* References to Beauty in St. Thomas.—Vol. XXIX, No. 2, Jan. 1952. *John J. Doyle:* The Hexagon of Relationships. *Paul Colaço:* The Absolute of Experience in the Philosophy of Aurobindo. *Anton-Hermann Chroust:* Socrates and Pre-Socratic Philosophy.—Vol. XXIX, No. 3, March 1952. *Brian Coffey:* Notes on Modern Cosmological Speculation. *F. G. Connolly:* Science *vs.* Philosophy. *Paul Colaço:* The Absolute of Creation in the Philosophy of Aurobindo. *Etienne Gilson:* Alphabetum Scoti.

THE NEW SCHOLASTICISM. Vol. XXV, No. 4, Oct. 1951. *John J. Doyle:* In Defense of the Square of Opposition. *Raymond J. Nogar:* Toward a Physical Theory. *Thomas B. Wright:* Necessary and Contingent Being in St. Thomas.—Vol. XXVI, No. 1, Jan. 1952. *Rudolf Allers:* On Intellectual Operations. *Fernand Van Steenberghen:* Thomism in a Changing World. *Sister M. Annice:* Historical Sketch of the Theory of Participation.

NOTAS Y ESTUDIOS DE FILOSOFÍA. Vol. II, Núm. 7–8, Julio-Dic. 1951. *E. W. Beth:* La existencia de los entes matemáticos. *A. H. Armstrong:* La significación real del mundo inteligible en Plotino. *José Ferrater Mora:* Suárez y la filosofía moderna. *Emilio Estiú:* Notas sobre la metafísica de Lessing. *Johann Gottlieb Fichte:* Dos fragmentos morales. Traducción, introducción y notas de Hernán Zucchi. *Gi-Ming Shien:* Sabiduría tradicional y filosofía revolucionaria en la China contemporánea. *Francisco Larroyo:* El existencialismo en México. *Rodolfo Mondolfo:* Sobre una interpretación reciente de Anaxágoras y los Eleatas.

THE PERSONALIST. Vol. XXXII, No. 4, Oct. 1951. *Ralph Tyler Flewelling:* Discovering Another Dimension. *W. H. Werkmeister:* Some Aspects of Contemporary Personalism. *André Lalande:* Personalism in France. *David Wesley Soper:* Woodrow Wilson's Concept of Personality. *C. J. Woollen:* The Buddhistic Parody. *Edward G. Ballard:* The Subject of Aristotle's *Poetics*.—Vol. XXXIII, No. 1, Jan. 1952. *Ralph Tyler Flewelling:* The Person As Field of Energy. *Wincenty Lutoslawski:* Polish Personalism. *Frank R. Snavely:* Religion As Apoca-

lypse. *Gerhard Friedrich:* Verse: Psalm Before Dawn. *Stanton A. Coblentz:* The Dementia of Nations. *Carl F. Strauch:* The Daemonic and Experimental in Emerson.

NOTES AND NEWS

We are grieved to learn of the death of Percy Hughes, emeritus professor of philosophy and psychology at Lehigh University, on April 22, at the age of eighty.

Professor Hughes was one of the oldest and most faithful friends of the JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY.

Katherine Everett Gilbert, professor of philosophy and chairman of the Department of Aesthetics, Art, and Music at Duke University, died on April 28 after a long illness. She was sixty-five years old. Her death is a loss to philosophy and scholarship.

Mrs. Gilbert had been awarded a Fulbright Scholarship for study abroad last May and was to have studied in Italy for a year. A collection of her essays, *Aesthetic Studies—Architecture and Poetry,* has been announced for publication on May 1 by the Duke University Press. A revised edition of the *History of Aesthetics,* which she wrote in collaboration with Professor Helmut Kuhn, is to be published this fall.

The John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation announced on April 21 the award of the following Fellowships:

Philosophy

DR. RODERICK FIRTH, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Swarthmore College. Foundations of empirical knowledge.

DR. GLENN RAYMOND MORROW, Professor of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania. Studies of Plato's Laws and of Greek legislation and political tradition.

Mathematical Logic

DR. RUDOLF CARNAP, Professor of Philosophy, University of Chicago. A study of the boundary field between logic and mathematics.

DR. JOHN RENFRED MYHILL, Instructor in Philosophy, Yale University. The theory of general recursive functions and its metamathematical applications.

American Philosophical Association, Western Division

Fiftieth Annual Meeting

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan,
May 8–10, 1952

Thursday, May 8, 1952

2:00 P.M. Theory of Knowledge. Room 1025 Angell Hall. Van Meter Ames, University of Cincinnati, *Chairman.*

"The Empirically Given and the Philosophic Given." Virgil G. Hinshaw, Jr., Ohio State University.

Discussion by A. C. Benjamin, University of Missouri.

"David Hume and the Pyrrhonian Controversy." Richard H. Popkin, State University of Iowa.

Discussion by J. R. Weinberg, University of Wisconsin.

8:00 P.M. Smoker. Ballroom of The Michigan Union.

Friday, May 9, 1952

9:00 A.M. Concurrent Sessions.

Section A: Theory of Value. Room 3 R and S, Michigan Union. Bertram Morris, University of Colorado, *Chairman.*

"Democratic and Totalitarian Concepts of Freedom." Denton L. Geyer, University of Missouri.

Discussion by Arthur E. Murphy, Cornell University.

"Is a Science of Aesthetic Criticism Possible?" A. M. Mardiros, University of Alberta.

Discussion by Philip B. Rice, Kenyon College.

Section B: Induction and Probability. Vandenburg Room, Michigan League. Everett W. Hall, State University of Iowa, *Chairman.*

"The Synthetic a Priori in Reichenbach's Justification of Probability." David L. Miller, University of Texas.

Discussion by Paul Henle, University of Michigan.

"The Empirical Determination of Antecedent Probabilities." Wesley C. Salmon, State College of Washington.

"The Principle of Induction." Asher Moore, Northwestern University.

Discussion by May Brodbeck, University of Minnesota.

1:30 P.M. What is the Present Status of the Mind-Body Problem? 3 R and S. Michigan Union. Martin ten Hoor, University of Alabama, *Chairman.*

Gustav Bergmann, State University of Iowa.

Warner Wick, University of Chicago.

Wilfrid Sellars, University of Minnesota.

(The first paper in this symposium will be taken as a point of departure for the papers of the second and third speakers.)

4:00 P.M. Tea.

The University of Michigan is host to the members, their wives and guests at the Second Floor Terrace of the Michigan Union.

7:00 P.M. Annual Dinner. Ballroom of the Michigan Union. Philip B. Rice, Vice-President of the Western Division, *Toastmaster.*

Presidential Address: "Symposia." Richard P. McKeon.

Saturday, May 10, 1952

9:00 A.M. Does Art Convey Knowledge? Amphitheater, Rackham School. Richard P. McKeon, University of Chicago, *Chairman.*

Eliseo Vivas, Northwestern University.

Ian McGreal, Southern Methodist University.

Abraham Kaplan, University of California at Los Angeles.

(The first paper in this symposium will be taken as a point of departure for the papers of the second and third speakers.)

11:00 A.M. Annual Business Meeting. Amphitheater, Rackham School. President McKeon, presiding.

Fourth Annual Meeting of the New Mexico Philosophical Society

On the campus of Eastern New Mexico University at Portales

Saturday and Sunday, April 26–27, 1952

Saturday

1:30 P.M. Registration. Student Union Building.

2:15 P.M. First Session:

"Some Comments on Knowledge and Revelation."

Speaker: Harold I. Woolard, Eastern New Mexico University.

Chairman: Lisle Hosford, New Mexico Highlands University.

4:30 P.M. President Golden's Reception. (The University President will guide guests on a brief campus tour following the Reception.)

7:00 P.M. Banquet.

Second Session:

"The Method of Philosophical Exploration."

Speaker: Hubert G. Alexander, University of New Mexico.

Chairman: Percy M. Baldwin, New Mexico State College.

Sunday

8:00 A.M. Breakfast.

9:30 A.M. Third Session:

"The Teaching of Ethics at the High School Level."

Speaker: C. C. Crawford, New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology.

Chairman: Vernon Welch, New Mexico Highlands University.

12:00 noon. Dinner. Cal Boykin Hotel private dining room. Adjournment.

Officers elected for 1952–53: President, Hubert G. Alexander; Vice President, Harold I. Woolard; Secretary-Treasurer, C. C. Crawford.

The Society will hold its Fifth Annual Meeting at the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, Soçorro.

The Forty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology was held in Knoxville, Tennessee, April 10–12, 1952. The host institution was the University of Tennessee. Twenty-six papers in philosophy and fifty-seven papers in psychology were read.

The joint session featured a symposium on "The Measurement of Values" in which Charles A. Baylis and Iredell Jenkins represented philosophy and Louis L. Thurstone and Edward E. Cureton represented psychology.

Newly elected officers are: Willis Moore, President; Oliver L. Lacey, Secretary; Glenn Negley and Karl Zener, Council members. William M. Hinton continues as Treasurer.

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No. 5. February 28, 1952.

Has Russell Answered Hume? HIRAM J. MCLENDON.

Has James Answered Hume? SING-NAN FEN.

Communication: The Concept of Man and the Philosophy of Education in East and West. KURT F. LEIDECKER.

No. 6. March 13, 1952.

The Role of Conventions in Ethics. HENRY DAVID AIKEN.

On the Tautologous Nature of Stevenson's Distinction between Disagreement in Belief and Disagreement in Attitude. SOLOMON E. LEVY.

No. 7. March 27, 1952.
Double Number.

The Zenith as Ideal. VAN METER AMES.

Normal Madness and the Political Life. STERLING P. LAMPRECHT.

Santayana and Realistic Conceptions of Authority. HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER.

Essence and Existence in George Santayana. CELESTINE J. SULLIVAN, JR.

A City in the Skies. MARTEN TEN HOOR.

The Psyche as Social Determinant. JOHN W. YOLTON.

No. 8. April 10, 1952.

Beauty and Interestingness. FRANCIS S. HASEROT.

Comments and Criticism.

Further Consideration of the Aesthetic Work of Art. STEPHEN C. PEPPER.

Comment. BERNHARD MOLLENHAUER.

No. 9. April 24, 1952.

Linguistic Approaches to Philosophical Problems. ALICE AMBROSE.

Comments on the "Proposal Theory" of Philosophy. RODERICK M. CHISHOLM.

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

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